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ABSTRACT
It is known that children with ADHD have social interaction difficulties (Clark,
Cheyne, Cunningham & Seigel, 1988) however little research has been done looking
at social understanding of children with ADHD. Recent studies have found that
children with ADHD have difficulties similar to those of autistic children in some
areas of social processing and some of the social behaviours common to autism have
been reported in ADHD children (Clark, Feehan, Tinline & Vostanis, 1999). Autism is
associated a specific impairment of'theory ofmind'.
The present study aimed to assess whether children with ADHD have deficits in
theory ofmind and social understanding.
Forty five children with a diagnosis of ADHD, aged six to twelve years, were tested
using 1st and 2nd order theory of mind tasks, a battery of naturalistic stories
measuring social reasoning and a response inhibition task. Aspects of social
behaviour were measured using a parent-rated questionnaire.
The results were analysed across age groups and compared with published normative
data. The results of the study were discussed with reference to theories linking
executive functioning and theory of mind. Possible relationships between autism and
ADHD were examined. The methodology of the study was criticised and the
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This introduction begins with a discussion of the definition ofADHD and recent theories
regarding the nature of the disorder. The social functioning of children with ADHD is
then reviewed with reference to social motivation, the role of executive functioning in
social interaction and the influence ofADHD on social learning. The concept 'theory of
mind' is defined and both neurologically based and social learning explanations for
theory of mind are discussed. Links between executive functioning in ADHD and
autism are examined and the possible relationship of these functions to theory of mind
outlined. Finally, the measures used to assess theory of mind are evaluated with
particular attention to language, executive functioning and their relationship to everyday
functioning.
1.1 Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD)
1.1.1 Definition of ADHD
At the beginning of the last century, a group of children were identified by Still (1902)
as having difficulties in "moral control" which he believed were due to constitutional or
inherited factors not parental or environmental influence (Hinshaw, 1994). Much later,
hyperactivity was identified as a major feature of the disorder (Laufer & Denhoff, 1957)
and subsequently inattention and impulsivity were included in the definition (Douglas,
1972). The International Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems (ICD-
10) argues that there is not sufficient knowledge of psychological processes of this
disorder to include 'attention' in the definition. Therefore ICD-10 refers to this group of
children as 'hyperkinetic' describing a lack of persistence in activities as a key
characteristic. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, fourth
edition, (DSM-IV) classes hyperactivity and impulsivity together as one impairment
with three subtypes, (i) predominantly inattentive, (ii) predominantly hyperactive-
impulsive and (iii) combined.
DSM-IV lists nine characteristics of inattention and nine of hyperactivity/ impulsivity
that may be exhibited by children with ADHD (Appendix 1). Barkley (1997) criticises
the DSM-IV criteria for ADHD as not accounting for the full range of symptoms of the
disorder. He suggests that the description of ADHD as comprising of two behavioural
deficits (inattention and hyperactivity-impulsivity) is insufficient. Deficits in executive
functioning and self-regulation are not accounted for in the DSM-IV definition and, as
Barkley (1997) points out, most if not all of the cognitive difficulties found in ADHD
can be explained by these categories. Additionally it has been suggested that identifying
attention as the primary deficit in ADHD may be misleading as children with ADHD
have been found to have consistent inhibitory control deficits on tasks where attentional
requirements vary (e.g. Schachar, Tannock and Logan, 1993).
Barkley (1990) has suggested the role of inhibition is a central component of the
disorder affecting the ADHD child's executive functioning and ability to self-regulate.
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This will now be considered in more detail.
1.1.2 ADHD, Inhibition and Self-Regulation
Executive function is defined by Lezak (1995) as 'those capacities that enable a person
to engage successfully in independent, purposive, self-serving behaviour' (p.42). These
functions include the ability to formulate intentions or goals, plan actions and execute
purposeful and effective behaviour (Lezak, 1995).
Barkley (1997) proposed that four executive functions are influenced by inhibition.
These are working memory, self-regulation of affect, motivation and arousal and
internalisation of speech and reconstitution (behavioural analysis and synthesis). He
suggested that inhibition of response is the first executive function required when
confronted with a stimulus and allows a necessary delay so that actions can be
considered in the light of information from other executive processes. The four
executive functions listed above are dependent on effective inhibition for control of their
functioning and contribute critically, to the ability to self-regulate. Barkley (1997)
argued that ineffective inhibition, as a central characteristic of ADHD, resulted in poor
regulation.
Self-regulation, as defined by Barkley (1997), is any self-directed behaviour, not
necessarily observable, which contributes to the likelihood of an individual's response
and as a consequence to the outcome of that response. Self-regulation includes self-
directed behaviours such as organisation of behaviour across time, the use of internal
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speech and consideration of rules and plans. Barkley (1997) highlighted certain kinds of
tasks that are likely to require self-regulation skills. These include tasks that involve
delays in consequence, resistance to temptation, delayed gratification or require novel
responses. Difficulty with self-regulation in children with ADHD presents as a tendency
to be influenced by the immediate environment and imminent consequences (Barkley,
1997). Children without ADHD, conversely, are more influenced by internal
information including past experience, predictions about the future, plans and rules.
Barkley proposed that the efficiency of these executive functions involved in self-
regulation is a result of both neurological and environmental influences including the
development of neural networks in the pre-frontal lobes, past experience of
consequences from actions, ongoing reinforcement and the social experience of the
individual. Thus, Barkley proposed that poor self-regulation in ADHD is a result of a
combination of neurological disorder and ongoing experience. That is that children with
ADHD develop behavioural responses and strategies that are difficult for the child to
modify in the face of limited processing resources (e.g. poor planning, poor use of past
experience, restricted ability to make predictions about the future).
Barkley accounts for inattention, traditionally assumed to be a major feature of ADHD,
as a result of insufficiencies in goal directed behaviour leading to a lack of persistence
with tasks. He describes two types of inattention or persistence, that which is self-
regulated and controlled by internal information and that which is motivated externally.
The first type is dependant on self-motivation and is required when doing tasks such as
writing an essay or doing a sheet of maths. The second type depends on factors such as
novelty of task and timing of reinforcement for persistence to be maintained. Barkley
suggested that children with ADHD have difficulty with the first type of inattention.
Thus, when rewards and feedback take longer to achieve and more internal regulation is
required, the executive functioning deficits described above make it difficult for children
with ADHD to persist. Thus children with ADHD may find sitting still and doing
homework difficult, but may be able to concentrate for long periods of time on computer
games which give regular reinforcement.
The emphasis of the above model on executive functioning as a core deficit suggests that
non-executive skills would not be affected by ADHD (Barkley, 1997). Barkley (1997)
proposed that the perception of others emotions is likely to remain unaffected for this
reason. However studies have found that children with ADHD had difficulty identifying
emotional expression and content in speech (Shapiro, Hughes, August & Bloomquist,
1993) and problems recognising facial expression of emotion (Singh, Ellis, Winton,
Singh, Leung, & Oswald, 1998). Pennington & Ozonoff (1996) suggest that the skills
needed for successful social interaction are similar to those required in executive
function tasks. That is, that success in both involves internal representation of concepts,
social or otherwise, when deciding on an appropriate response. It seems reasonable to
assume that difficulties with self-regulation will affect social interaction as those
children will have a tendency to react to the immediate environment and consequences
rather than integrating past information and therefore may have difficulty making
predictions about the likely behaviour of others involved in the interaction and problems
-5-
adhering to internal plans and rules.
1.2 ADHD and Social Interaction
Children with ADHD have been found to have problems with relationships with peers
(Clark, Cheyne, Cunningham & Siegel, 1988), teachers and parents (Whalen, Henker &
Dotemoto, 1980; Campbell, 1973). They have been found to be less likely to respond to
the questions or verbal interactions of their peers (Landau & Milich, 1988) and have
been shown to elicit more controlling and directive behaviour from their peers than non-
ADHD children (Clark et ah, 1988). Studies have shown that children with ADHD
have problems with identifying the emotional expression and content in speech (Shapiro
et al., 1993), difficulty recognising facial expression of emotion (Singh et al., 1998),
deficiencies of social knowledge (Grenell, Glass & Katz, 1987), elicit more aggression
and less verbal reciprocity from their peers (Clark et al., 1988) and exhibit differences in
judging the acceptability of others behaviour (Whalen & Henker, 1985). Additionally,
many of the DSM-IV criteria for ADHD reflect pragmatic communication difficulties
e.g. difficulty with turn taking, interrupting others and not listening to what is being said
(Giddan, 1991). Thus there is evidence that children with ADHD have social
difficulties. However there are a number of possible explanations to account for the
origins of these difficulties. Children with ADHD may have different social goals and
motivations (Whalen and Henker, 1992) or executive functioning deficits may cause
inappropriate response in social situations (Pennington & Ozonoff, 1996). Alternatively




Whalen & Henker (1992) suggested that differences in the social interaction of this
group may be due to motivation. That is, these children know which behaviours are
appropriate and which are not, however, different social goals and agenda mediate their
interaction. In support of this, Whalen, Henker & Granger (1990) found that children
with ADHD were as able as controls to identify inappropriate behaviours in their peers
and those who cause trouble, suggesting good social knowledge. When asked to identify
children who were fun to be with, ADHD children proposed significantly more children
than their peers and teachers including these children who were labelled as
'troublemakers' (Whalen & Henker, 1985). They interpret this finding as evidence that
children with ADHD have a greater tolerance of those with deviant behaviour and may
even enjoy difficult behaviours in others and therefore are motivated by different
outcomes in interaction. However, the ADHD children in this study may have been
accepting these children in attempts to convey acceptance of themselves, who may also
have been labelled a 'troublemaker'. Also this suggestion does not account for deficits
in social processing of emotional information (Shapiro et al., 1993; Singh et ah, 1998)
deficits in social knowledge (Grenell et ah, 1987) and difficulties in organising
conversation (Hamlett, Pelligrini & Conners, 1987) which are found in children with
ADHD.
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1.2.2 Executive Functioning and Social Interaction.
Many of the social difficulties ADHD children have seem to lend themselves readily to
an executive dysfunction explanation. Barkley, Cunningham & Karlsson (1983) found
that children with ADHD talk more than their peers. However, when they are required to
organise their speech in response to a specific goal they have more difficulty (Hamlett et
al., 1987). Barkley (1990) suggested that this is due to deficits in executive functioning
which affect the ability to organise and monitor verbal communication.
Studies of peer interaction by Grenell et al. (1987) found ADHD children to be
significantly poorer than their peers on measures of social knowledge. Although
children with ADHD were able to describe how to initiate interaction, their knowledge
about situations involving maintaining relationships was limited. They gave less
effective suggestions that showed less impulsive control than those of their peers.
Grenell et al. (1987) proposed that more complex problem solving skills are involved in
maintaining than initiating a relationship and that this was more challenging for the
ADHD than the non-ADHD children. They also suggested that ADHD children had
more difficulty considering long-term consequences and were more bound by short-term
reward. This explanation is compatible with Barkley's suggestions that ADHD children
are more governed by immediate consequences and have difficulty with goal directed
behaviour and is consistent with the suggestion that executive functioning may influence
these children's social ability when selecting appropriate responses in interaction.
Other deficits, such as difficulties processing emotional information are more difficult to
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explain in terms of executive dysfunction. Barkley (1997) predicted that the executive
functioning difficulties of ADHD would not influence the perception of emotion in
others because of its non-executive nature. However, this type of difficulty has been
found in children with ADHD (Shapiro et al., 1993; Singh et ah, 1998).
Shapiro et al. (1993) investigated the ability of ADHD children to process emotional
stimuli using recordings of speech with varied emotional expression and content and
pictures of various facial expressions. Overall they found that the emotional processing
skills of ADHD children did not differ from controls. However, significant differences
were found between ADHD and non-ADHD children on two of the measures, one
requiring the matching ofprosody and content in speech and the other matching audio to
visual emotional stimuli (Table 1.1). The authors explain this as a difficulty with
auditory processing and working memory. However there was no difference between
the ADHD and non-ADHD children on working memory tasks. The tasks that the
ADHD children performed more poorly on, involved processing conflicting emotion and
content of speech or conflicting emotion and facial expression. An alternative
explanation for Shapiro et al.'s findings is that ADHD children were able to process
emotional information of one type e.g. matching facial expressions, however, difficulties
occurred when there was conflicting information requiring two types of processing
(auditory and visual processing). These tasks required more internal organisation and
therefore placed more demands on executive functioning. This explanation is consistent
with the finding that children with ADHD perform more poorly than non-ADHD
children on tasks involving processing conflicting information and inhibiting one
-9-
response in preference for another, such as the Stroop test (Barkley, Grodzinsky &
DuPaul, 1992; Grodzinsky & Diamond, 1992). This explanation for Shapiro's findings
is consistent with the hypotheses that executive functioning influences social ability in
children with ADHD.
Table 1.1 Emotional Processing in Children with ADHD Compared with Controls in a Study by
Shapiro et al. (1993).
Task ADHD vs Control
Matching inverted faces Not Significant
Matching faces with different expressions No. Significant
Matching facial expressions on different faces Not Significant
Identifying facial expression Not Significant
Preference for prosody or content in judging affect in speech Not Significant
Matching speech prosody to speech content Significant
11(111 -A 18 BH 1
Matching speech prosody to facial expression Significant
Facial memory Not Significant
Object memory Not Significant
There is some evidence that is difficult to reconcile with the idea that executive
functioning deficits influence social processing. Singh et al. (1998) found evidence that
children with ADHD have difficulties processing emotional stimuli through
investigating perception of facial expression in children with ADHD. They found that
when compared to controls, children with ADHD had more difficulty correctly
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identifying facial expressions of emotion. These children however did show an ability
to discriminate between facial expressions. Thus the children were able to process the
information visually, internally manipulate the information to compare faces and then
make a judgement about their similarities or differences. This contradicts Shapiro et
al.'s interpretation of their findings as indicating difficulties in perceiving stimuli and
suggests that children may be able to deal executively with visual information but may
not have the social knowledge or understanding to evaluate it. This suggests that the
social deficits ofADHD may extend beyond executive functioning.
1.2.3 ADHD and Social Learning.
As discussed above, executive functioning deficits may account for some of the social
difficulties experienced by children with ADHD. If deficits in executive functioning
affect social ability in the everyday interactions of children with ADHD, then these
deficits may have an affect the development of social skills. Camarata & Gibson (1999)
presented a theory on how features of ADHD may affect the development of pragmatic
communication skills.
Pragmatic communication skills are defined as the aspects of social interaction that are
not included in the structural (grammatical) domain, deficits of which significantly
disrupt conversation (Giddan, 1991). These deficits include inappropriate eye contact,
failure to effectively monitor the conversation, poor turn taking, excessive talking, poor
response to shifts of topic, poor assessment of body language and facial cues, frequent
interruption and failure to take account of others needs in conversation (Camarata &
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Gibson, 1999; Giddan, 1991).
Camarata & Gibson (1999) describe the hypothesis that interactions between mother and
child facilitate language development. They applied the transactional model of mother-
child interaction to pragmatic aspects of language learning, where the child's language
in interaction with their parent instigates certain types of response from their parent.
These responses facilitate language advances in the child whose returns then prompt a
more advanced response from their parent. The important pragmatics a child needs at
this stage of language learning are, the ability to initiate interaction, respond
appropriately and maintain attention on the interaction. The exchanges involved in the
development of language, Camarata & Gibson (1999) suggest, are likely to be
compromised in children with ADHD. The characteristics associated with inattention in
ADHD include failure to attend to instructions, difficulty sustaining attention in play,
susceptibility to distraction and a tendency to not listen. This may affect parent-child
interaction in several areas. A distracted child may disrupt the flow of conversation at
the point where a non-ADHD child would be initiating the next parental response.
Further more, the child may not attend closely enough to his parent's response and
therefore miss the cues which prompt the next advance in language. Additionally, the
child's parent may terminate the interaction sooner due to a perception that the child is
not interested. Also, due to increased potential of disruption to the interaction, fewer
completed conversations may be experienced by the ADHD child resulting in fewer
experiences prompting language skills (Camarata & Gibson, 1999).
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Additionally, ADHD children may frequently change topic disrupting the course of the
interaction, leave the scene before the conversation is complete or interrupt or talk over
the parent's attempts to reciprocate. Much of the time spent together may also be spent
trying to control the child's behaviour, thus exchanges are more negative and more
directive therefore less facilitative to the style of interaction required to encourage
language development (Camarata & Gibson, 1999).
Some evidence for these suggestions was found by Clark, Feehan, Tinline & Vostanis
(1999). In a study of the prevalence of symptoms commonly associated with autism in
children with ADHD, Clark et al. (1999) questioned the parents of 49 children and found
that most reported that their ADHD child had a 'lack of awareness of the feelings of
others' (85.7%), had 'difficulty forming relationships' (81.6%), a 'difficulty in knowing
how to begin or sustain a conversation' (77.5%) and had a 'lack of desire to interact with
others' (55.1%). Although these are commonly reported autistic symptoms, Clark et al.
(1999) suggested that they would be expected as a result ofADHD. Difficulties waiting
in turn taking, interruption of others and being easily distracted are among the symptoms
of ADHD that could produce the impression of being unaware of the feelings of others
(Clark et al., 1999). Similarly, these symptoms could result in difficulties with
relationships and in conversation. Lack of ability to interact may be misconstrued as a
lack ofwillingness to interact and explain the majority of children being rated as having
a 'lack of desire to interact with others'.
Parents also reported symptoms that would not be expected as a result of the features of
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ADHD. Many of them described their children as having 'stereotyped hand and body
movements' (71.4%) or 'odd forms of speech' (75.5%).
Clark et al. (1999) highlighted poor eye contact, failure to greet others and difficulties
observing others personal space as commonly reported behaviours that are not easily
explained by ADHD. However, these difficulties could be explained if features of
ADHD influence development of social functioning, not just those areas which are
immediately affected by difficulties such as inhibition. Therefore children with ADHD,
because of deficits in executive functioning, may have less opportunity to experience
appropriate interaction and learn about social skills and as a result may develop deficits
in several areas of social functioning, not just the areas which are directly affected by
executive processes. This would also offer an explanation for the results of Singh et
al.'s (1998) study, that the ability to assign meaning to facial expression may have been
compromised in children with ADHD as a result of impoverished social experience and
effective utilisation of feedback about the meaning of facial expressions.
In summary, children with ADHD have been found to have difficulties interacting with
other children and adults. Studies with children with ADHD have found problems with
processing information relevant to social interactions (Shapiro et al., 1993; Singh et al.,
1998), social knowledge (Grenell et al., 1987) and pragmatic skills such as awareness of
others feelings and poor eye contact (Clark et al., 1999). Some of these deficits are
readily explained by the executive functioning difficulties of children with ADHD,
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others may be a result of the influence on social experience that executive functioning
deficits have.
Some of the social behaviours mentioned above indicate a lack of regard for others in
interaction e.g. inappropriate eye contact, frequent interruptions, difficulties with turn
taking, failure to observe personal space. Peterson & Seigal (1995) suggest that social
communication deficits are likely to contribute to poorer quality of interactions around
mind states. They suggest that it may be less likely for adults to discuss their thoughts
and intentions with children with communication problems. As suggested above,
ADHD may affect mother child interaction and the development of pragmatic language
(Camarata & Gibson, 1999). These assumptions infer that children with ADHD would
have reduced opportunities to learn about the feelings and thoughts of others and
therefore may face difficulties in social situations which require an understanding of
others minds. The ability to understand others minds has been termed 'theory ofmind'.
The following section examines the concept of theory of mind and the main research
findings relating to this aspect of social understanding before discussing how this might
relate to children with ADHD.
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1.3 Theory of Mind
1.3.1 Definition of Theory of Mind
The first references to studies of the development of children's ability to distinguish
between mental and physical states were by Piaget (1962). He described four stages of
cognitive development. In the second stage, which Piaget termed preoperational, he
proposed that children aged two to seven years develop the ability to represent things
which are not present. This ability to symbolize is apparent in their capability to engage
in pretend play. He suggested at this stage that children are 'egocentric', meaning that
they do not understand that others have different perspectives and assume that others
see, feel and think exactly as they do. Although Piaget's theories are much criticized,
not least for the measures on which he based his conclusions (Bernstein, Roy, Srull &
Wickens, 1988), they illustrate the first attempt to propose a theory of development of
the ability to understand others feelings and thoughts.
The term 'theory of mind' was first used by Premack & Woodruff (1978) in their
investigations into the ability of chimpanzees to attribute mental states to others.
Theory ofmind has been defined by Tager-Flusberg, Baron-Cohen & Cohen (1993) as:
the ability of normal children to attribute mind states (such as beliefs, desires,
intentions, etc.) to themselves and other people, as a way ofmaking sense of and
predicting behaviour (p.3).
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Thus theory ofmind can be described as the ability to make inferences about a person's
expectations and beliefs and to use this information to anticipate and understand their
behaviour. For example, if I give my Mum a chocolate box on her birthday and she
smiles, I assume that she believes that there are chocolates inside the box. That is, I
think that she thinks that the box contains chocolate and this has made her pleased. This
ability to form a conception of others' beliefs is termed first order theory of mind. When
the assumptions required are more complex and involve others' beliefs about what
others are thinking and feeling e.g. my Dad thinks that my Mum thinks that there are
chocolates in the box, this is referred to as second order theory ofmind.
Thus theory ofmind requires the ability to understand that others have minds and mental
states e.g. beliefs, hopes, intentions, thoughts and wants, which influence their
behaviour. This ability is an essential part of appropriate and effective interaction.
The majority of studies looking at theory of mind have focused on children's ability to
understand that another person can hold a belief that differs from their own and from
reality, that is, a belief which is false. Wimmer & Perner (1983) were the first to
investigate false belief. They used a scenario for young children where the child's own
beliefwas different from that of a character in the scenario and to succeed in the task the
child had to recognize that the character can hold a different, and false, belief. This task
was adapted by Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith (1985) to form the 'Sally Anne Task'
which is now commonly used to assess first order theory of mind. In this task, Sally
puts her ball in a basket and then her friend, unknown to Sally, removes it and places it
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in a box. When Sally returns, the child is asked where she will look for the ball. Giving
the correct answer requires the child to understand that Sally holds a belief which is
different from his/ her own and is false. That is, the child understands the concept of
false belief.
The age of acquisition of this ability is still debated and varies according to the type of
task or measure used (Happe, 1999). However, it is agreed that most normal children
develop first order theory ofmind by the age of four (Wimmer & Perner, 1983; Baron-
Cohen et al., 1985).
The origins of theory ofmind have been extensively debated recently. Several studies
have focused on autistic children, known to have theory of mind deficits and it has been
suggested that their theory of mind difficulty has a neurological basis (Frith, 1992).
However researchers studying theory ofmind in non-autistic populations have suggested
a social learning based explanation for theory of mind deficits. These two theories are
examined below.
1.3.2 Theory of mind and neurological functioning
Research into theory of mind has consistently involved people with autism. The core
symptoms of autism are conceptualised as belonging to a triad of impairments:
socialisation, communication and imagination. One of the most prominent symptoms of
autism is an impairment of verbal and non-verbal social communication (Baron-Cohen,
1988). This is identified as a core deficit in autism which is manifest as severe
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difficulties understanding and reacting appropriately to social stimuli.
Baron-Cohen et al. (1985) assessed the understanding of false belief in autistic children,
controlling for intelligence and found that autistic children consistently failed to take
account of others beliefs whereas children with Down's Syndrome and normally
developing pre-school children consistently considered beliefs when predicting puppets'
behaviour. They conclude that this finding is evidence for a specific cognitive
impairment which cannot be explained by low intelligence and which can explain the
social impairments of autism.
Frith (1992) suggests that theory of mind or 'mentalising' is a single cognitive deficit
that can account for the triad of impairments in autism and that this deficit is a direct
result of a brain abnormality and therefore, theory of mind deficits have a biological
explanation.
Evidence from examining theory ofmind in people with brain injury have helped further
theories on the role of neurological systems in theory ofmind.
The possibility of a specific module in the brain dedicated to theory of mind has been
debated (Happe, Brownell, & Winner 1999). They examined theory of mind in people
with right hemisphere damage who are commonly found to exhibit social and
communication problems that are similar to high functioning people with autism. Happe
et al. (1999) reasoned that if a dedicated neurological system for theory of mind existed
-19-
in the right hemisphere, those with damage in this area would be expected to have
deficits in theory of mind but preservation of other reasoning skills. They found that
patients with right hemisphere damage performed significantly worse on theory of mind
tasks than those with left hemisphere damage and controls. This supports the suggestion
that right hemisphere processes have a key role in theory of mind.
Evidence from functional imaging studies however has revealed mixed results.
Activation of the right orbito-frontal regions has been found when participants are asked
to identify words associated with the mind, such as 'think' (Baron-Cohen, Ring,
Moriarty, Schmitz, Costa & Ell, 1994). However other studies have reported brain
activity in the temporal lobes, left superior temporal gyrus and posterior cingulated
cortex (Fletcher, Happe, Frith, Baker, Dolan, Frackowiak & Frith, 1995).
Happe et al. (1999) suggest that this may be explained by neural circuitry dysfunction
that could affect different sites in the brain. They also point out that their findings
support right hemisphere involvement in theory of mind ability in normal adults but do
not necessarily imply that the right hemisphere is essential in the development of theory
of mind or rule out the possibility that damage to other areas of the brain could affect
theory ofmind. Their findings importantly suggest that the mechanisms of normal adult
theory of mind can be affected separately from other reasoning mechanisms which
suggests cognitive specialization in normal adults, for this ability.
Studies of theory of mind in populations that are not autistic have provided evidence
-20-
which conflicts with a purely neurological explanation for the development of theory of
mind.
1.3.3 Theory ofMind and Social Learning
One of the populations studied by several authors exploring theory of mind, is deaf
children (Peterson & Siegal, 1995; Russell, Hosie, Gray, Scott, Hunter, Banks &
Macaulay, 1998; Peterson & Siegal, 1998). Peterson & Siegal (1995 ) argued that the
biological hypothesis, does not account for other influences which may affect the
development of theory ofmind such as sensory, physiological or social handicaps. They
suggested that deaf children are ofparticular interest since their disability severely limits
the access they have to information about other's minds. Research has shown that the
hearing parents of deaf children rarely attain a competency level in signing which allows
them to communicate with their child fluently about their own thoughts and beliefs
(Peterson & Peterson, 1990). The conversational interactions between deaf children and
their parents tend to be limited to topics of visual reference (Schlesinger & Meadow,
1972) and therefore topics which involve mind states including false beliefs would be
seldom discussed. Peterson & Siegal have shown in two separate studies that deaf
children performed similarly to autistic children and failed first order theory of mind
tasks (Peterson & Siegal, 1995; Peterson & Siegal, 1998). They suggest this contradicts
the hypothesis that theory ofmind difficulties are specific to autism. Since deaf children
do not share the triad of impairments associated with autism, Peterson & Siegal (1995)
conclude that deficits in the understanding of false-belief could occur in deaf children
for different reasons. Tager-Flusberg (1992), however, found that children with autism
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also engage in very few or no conversational exchanges with their mothers on topics
involving mind states. This was found to be true even when other topics of conversation
were engaged in as fluently as other children of a similar mental age. However, whereas
deaf children have a lack of opportunity to discuss mind states due to language barriers,
autistic children may miss out on mind state conversations as they are less willing to
interact with others. Alternatively or in addition, they may not have the cognitive ability
to understand these interactions (Frith, 1989).
Thus autistic children have in common with deaf children, a poverty of exposure to
exchanges about mind states. Peterson & Siegal (1998) point out that the reasons for
deficits on false belief tasks in autistic and deaf children may be different. The
neurological account seems more plausible for children with autism as it is accepted as a
neurologically based disorder. In deaf children, neurological deficit seems implausible,
however Peterson & Siegal (1999) suggest a neurological basis for the difficulties
experienced by deaf children is a possibility since neuro-imaging studies have shown
different patterns of activity between hearing and deaf adults (Neville, Coffrey, Lawson,
Fischer, Emorey & Bellugi, 1997).
Peterson & Siegal (1998) postulate a link between the two accounts based on the theory
that there is a critical period of brain development which is especially important to the
development of understanding of mind states (Lenneberg, 1967) and that this is
compromised by a lack of conversational exposure to information about others minds in
early development. Russell et al. (1998) found evidence contrary to this hypothesis by
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studying a wider age range of deaf children. Significantly more of the older children in
their study (aged 13-16) passed theory of mind tests than those aged 4-12. They
suggested that their findings conflict with an innate hypothesis of theory of mind and
conceptualise the difficulties deaf children have with false belief as a developmental
delay, which is caused by restricted experience, rather than an enduring deficit.
Studies involving visually impaired children also emphasise the importance of social
experience in the development of theory of mind. Visually mediated experience, such as
shared visual attention or determining the source of other peoples response, is likely to
be compromised in visually impaired children (Hobson, 1990; Minter, Hobson & Bishop
1998). This, suggested Minter et al., may have implications for the ability of severely
visually impaired children to develop an appreciation of others minds.
Minter et al. (1998) studied the performance of visually impaired children on theory of
mind tasks which were adjusted to give tactile rather than visual information. They
found that significantly more visually impaired children failed theory of mind tasks than
their sighted peers. As with hearing impaired children, it is possible that the source of
the difficulties experienced by these children is a poverty of social experience. Minter et
al. (1998) hypothesised that visually impaired children's inability to share visual
attention and difficulties understanding the focus of reference in others response may in
turn influence others reactions to them, including giving information about their own
feelings and intentions, and further reduce their opportunity to process information and
learn about mental states. This is consistent with a social learning hypothesis for theory
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ofmind.
Further evidence supporting the importance of social interaction in developing theory of
mind is provided by studies of normal children. Perner, Ruffman & Leekman (1994)
suggested that children who have siblings should have an advantage in developing
knowledge of others mind states, reasoning that play with siblings gives rich
opportunities to learn about mind states and sibling conflicts prompt discussions with
parents about feelings and moral issues encouraging consideration of others. In support
of this, Perner et al. (1994) found that the number of siblings a child had was positively
related to performance on theory of mind tasks. This finding was replicated by Lewis,
Freeman, Kyriakidou, Maridaki-Kassotaki & Berridge (1996) although they found that
this was only true where the siblings were older. However conflicting findings were
discovered by Cutting & Dunn (1999) who found that number of siblings in the family
was not related to understanding of emotion or false belief. It may be that it is the
quality of interaction that is important not the amount of interaction that affects theory of
mind development (Perner at al., 1994). In support of this, Youngblade and Dunn
(1995) found that social play with mothers and siblings at 33 months of age was related
to social understanding at 40 months of age and Dunn, Brown, Slomkowski, Tesla, &
Youngblade (1991) found that mothers conversations about feelings when their child
was 33 months old related to understanding of emotion and false beliefwhen they were
40 months old.
Thus evidence supporting a social influence on the development of theory of mind is
-24-
substantial. What is not known is whether deficits in theory of mind ability in deaf and
blind children have a different cause from the difficulties experienced by autistic
children in this area or whether the social experience of children with autism is not given
enough emphasis as an influential factor in the development of theory of mind.
Alternatively there may be an interaction between neurological capacity and social
experience which facilitates development of theory ofmind.
Children with autism also have executive functioning deficits and it has been argued that
this is linked with deficits in theory of mind. The following section discusses the
executive functioning profile of ADHD and autism and the evidence linking executive
functioning and theory ofmind.
1.4 Executive Functioning
1.4.1 Executive Functioning, Autism and ADHD
As described above, executive functions include the ability to formulate intentions or
goals, plan actions and execute purposeful and effective behaviour (Lezak, 1995).
Typically those with executive dysfunction (EDF) have problems in all these areas with
one or two areas being more affected (Lezak, 1995). Executive functions are primarily
associated with the frontal lobes although executive functioning deficits can occur as a
result of damage to other areas of the brain including subcortical damage and right
hemisphere damage (Lezak, 1995). EDF has been found in children with autism
(Ozonoff, Pennington & Rogers, 1991a) and children with ADHD (Seidman,
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Biederman, Faraone, Weber & Ouellette, 1997; Grodzinsky & Diamond, 1992)
Pennington & Ozonoff (1996) reviewed the literature concerning executive functioning
(EF) and autism, ADHD and Tourettes syndrome. They concluded that the severity and
profile of EF deficits in ADHD and autism varies. In their review they found that
ADHD children tend to have deficits on EF tasks which require inhibition whereas
autistic subjects had more difficulty relative to controls on tasks requiring flexibility.
These findings were confirmed by Ozonoff & Jensen (1999) who conducted the first
study which directly compared children with autism, ADHD and Tourettes on three EF
measures, the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task (WCST), the Tower of Hanoi, (TOH) and
the Stroop Color-Word Test. They found that autistic subjects had significantly poorer
performance on the WCST and TOH than the ADHD or Tourettes subjects. Thus
illustrating difficulties in planning and flexibility. In comparison, the children with
ADHD had more difficulty on the Stroop test relative to the other groups but were not
impaired on the WCST and TOH. They conclude that although several disorders share
EF deficits in common with autism, if the profiles of the EF deficits are examined in
more detail they will reveal differences that may account for different behavioural
presentation.
Other studies however have found that children with ADHD have difficulty with tasks
involving planning and flexibility such as the WCST (Seidman et al., 1997). If deficits
usually present across the range of executive functions, as suggested by Lezak (1995), it
may be that the different cognitive profiles found in children with ADHD and autism
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may be attributable to a different balance of EF deficits. Thus children with ADHD and
autism would be expected to have some behavioural similarities but different severities
of these behaviours linked to EF.
1.4.2 Executive Functioning and Theory ofMind
Some of the behavioural symptoms common to autistic people are consistent with those
expected in executive dysfunction e.g. insistence on sameness, difficulty coping with
change, restricted interests. Difficulties with orientation to the future and consideration
of long-term consequences as well as problems with self-reflection and self-monitoring
are associated with autism and may be explained by EF deficits (Ozonoff et ah, 1991a).
It has been suggested that EF deficits may be a primary cause of autism and therefore
underlie the cognitive and behavioural presentation of the disorder, including
impairment of theory of mind (e.g. Russell, Mauthner, Sharpe & Tidswell, 1991).
Alternatively poor performance on EF tasks may be a result of other impairments that
are primary to autism. For example, difficulties on the WCST could be explained by
deficits in skills which are not executive e.g. socially interactive verbal feedback
(Pennington & Ozonoff, 1996). Furthermore, EF deficits may be associated with autism
but not play a causal role or be a result of, the presence of other cognitive and
behavioural symptoms. These three hypotheses are examined below.
Russell et al. (1991) suggests that EF deficits account for theory of mind difficulties as
the tasks used to study theory of mind require a child to suppress the more salient
knowledge of reality in order to recognise another's false belief requiring executive
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control.
However, some studies have failed to find a link between EF and theory of mind.
Ozonoff, Rogers & Pennington (1991b) found that a sub-group of their subjects who had
Asperger's syndrome had EF deficits but performed well on theory of mind tasks.
Griffith, Pennington, Wehner & Rogers (1999) studied children between the ages of 40
and 61 months with autism and found that they performed as well as a control group on
eight measures of EF. They reasoned that if no EF deficits were found at this age, when
children had been identified by their behaviour as being autistic, then it is unlikely that
EDF can account for the behavioural and cognitive symptoms of autism.
Therefore, although there is substantial evidence to support a link between EF and
autism, there is evidence which clearly disputes the hypothesis that EDF could account
for the behavioural and cognitive symptoms of autism including theory ofmind deficits.
The second suggested hypothesis is that EF deficits are secondary to other primary
symptoms of autism. Pennington & Ozonoff (1996) suggest that lack of social
experience in autism may give reduced opportunity to practise cognitive flexibility that
is abundant in social interactions. This hypothesis is also contradicted by the findings of
Griffith et al. (1999) that show that the symptoms of autism can exist independently of
executive dysfunction, that is, performance on EF tasks can be intact when other deficits
are present.
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The final hypothesis to be considered is that EF and the other cognitive and behavioural
symptoms of autism are present alongside each other, with a potentially related cause.
Mitchell (1997) described theory of mind and executive functioning deficits as two
separate kinds of cognitive deficiency. He suggests that some of the behaviours in
autism can be explained by deficits in theory ofmind whereas other behaviours, such as
narrow interests and insistence on sameness are explained by impaired EF. The
evidence presented above (Griffith et ah, 1999; Ozonoff et ah, 1991b) suggests that the
two deficits although often co-occurring, are not necessarily related in autism. Ozonoff
et al. (1991b) discuss the causal role of pre-frontal impairment in EF and theory of mind
deficits. They review evidence that the pre-frontal cortex is involved in both EF and
social ability (e.g. communication, affect, appreciation for social rules). It has been
proposed that the pre-frontal cortex facilitated the use of stored information in mediating
behavioural response (Goldman-Rakic, 1987). Based on this assumption, Ozonoff et al.
(1991b) suggest that to succeed on a theory of mind task, a subject must be able to
internally represent others and their own mind states and act upon this information.
Similarly, performance on an EF task involves internal representation of concepts and
assumptions about the tasks, which is referred to when organising and choosing a
response.
In conclusion, both ADHD and autistic children show EF deficits, however this may
vary according to the particular skill required. People with autism tend to have more
difficulties on tasks requiring planning and flexibility and ADHD subjects have more
difficulty with tasks involving inhibition. Although there is evidence to suggest that
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ADHD children also have difficulties in planning and flexibility. Executive functioning
deficits have been linked with theory ofmind although evidence suggests that this link is
not causal and may be no more than symptoms commonly present in autism. It may be
that neurological areas responsible for EF and the integration of social information are
both affected in autism and therefore deficits in these two areas often co-occur.
Therefore, if there is a link between executive functioning and theory of mind, it may be
that the EF deficits in children with ADHD are also linked with theory of mind
difficulties.
The grounds for investigation of theory of mind in ADHD and the studies of theory of
mind that have included children with ADHD are discussed below.
1.5 Theory ofMind and ADHD
There are several reasons for supposing that children with ADHD may have theory of
mind difficulties.
The social learning experience of children with ADHD is likely to be affected by the
features of ADHD. As discussed above, difficulties with self-regulation and inhibition
may interfere with learning of appropriate social interaction skills and may affect others
social responses to children with ADHD. Since evidence indicates that quality of social
experience influences theory of mind development, this suggests that this group may be
disadvantaged when developing an understanding of others mind states.
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Children with ADHD have executive functioning deficits, as do children with autism.
Evidence suggests that these deficits may not be causally linked with theory of mind in
autism. However it is also argued that the processes involved in executive functioning
are similar to those required for social processing (Osonoff et al., 1991b). That is,
internal representation of concepts, organisation and integration of information and
planning responses. Children with ADHD have been found to have social processing
deficits in other areas e.g. organising speech (Hamlett et al., 1987), matching prosody
and content in speech (Shapiro et al., 1993) which may be explained by executive
functioning deficits. These difficulties may extend to other areas of social processing
and affect abilities such as theory of mind.
Neurological deficits have been implicated in theory of mind difficulties and in ADHD.
Several neurological aetiologies have been proposed to explain ADHD. Theories of
biochemical dysfunction have implicated neurotransmitters and norepinephine levels in
the right hemisphere (Spreen, Risser & Edgell, 1995). Other theorists have suggested
immaturities or late maturation of the frontal lobes (Spreen et al., 1995), or lack of blood
flow to the frontal lobes (Lou, Henriksen & Bruhn, 1984). Therefore, although the
presence of neurological differences in children with ADHD is generally agreed, there is
much debate about the exact nature of these differences.
Given the inconclusive results from neuro-imaging studies of theory of mind, it is not
possible to hypothesis a link between areas of brain dysfunction in children with ADHD
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and areas responsible for theory ofmind. However as discussed by Happe et al. (1999)
damage to neural circuitry may implicate several areas of the brain.
Baron-Cohen, Tager-Flusberg & Cohen (1999) highlighted the links between ADHD
and executive functioning and ADHD and Social Learning and indicated the lack
research examining theory of mind and children with ADHD. There have been no
studies that have addressed this population specifically however, two studies examining
theory ofmind have included children with ADHD.
Buitelaar, Van der Wees, Swaab-Barneveld & Van der Gaag (1999) used ADHD
children along with other children in a psychiatric population to compare the
performance on theory of mind tasks with children with autism and children with
pervasive developmental disorders. The children with ADHD could not be
differentiated from autistic children and performed significantly worse than normal
controls. Conversely, the others in the psychiatric group, diagnosed with conduct
disorder or dysthymia, performed as well as the normal children on theory ofmind tasks.
Variance in performance on second order theory ofmind tasks contributed to most of the
differences between the groups. They interpret this finding as in accordance with the
findings of Pennington & Ozonoff (1996) that impairment in executive functioning is
associated with ADHD (see section 1.4.1). They also describe a case study of a non-
autistic 9 year old boy with executive functioning deficits and problems with theory of
mind and emotional recognition tasks but good verbal comprehension and reasoning
abilities (Buitelaar, Swaab, van der Wees, Wildschut, & van der Gaag, 1996) They
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argued that his verbal ability compensated for his executive functioning deficits which
they proposed would affect theory ofmind ability. They suggest that further research is
indicated to investigate whether difficulty with second order theory of mind tasks is
associated with neuropsychiatric disorders involving frontal lobe dysfunction.
Conversely, a study by Muris, Steerneman, Meesters, Merckelback, Horsenleberg, Van
den Hogen & van Dongen, (1999) used children with ADHD as controls to validate a
theory of mind test they had developed. They found that the children with ADHD
performed better than those in a groups of pervasive developmental disorder and autism
and equally as well as those with anxiety. However their numbers were small (14
children with ADHD) and this may have masked differences between the ADHD and
anxiety group. The anxiety group may also have performed below expected levels due
to performance anxiety and the absence of a normal control group meant that problems
in this group compared with the normal population could have been missed.
Therefore ADHD has several links with associated deficits and hypothesised causes of
theory of mind. However theory of mind in this population has not been specifically
studied and studies on theory of mind which have included children with ADHD have
found mixed results.
1.6 Measuring Theory ofMind
Several tasks have been developed in the attempt to measure theory of mind. In the
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following section, the literature on the reliability and validity of theory of mind tasks is
examined with particular attention to language and executive functioning, two areas
commonly affected in ADHD and which may influence outcome on the tasks.
Wimmer & Perner (1983) found that 78% of four and five year olds performed correctly
on a false belief task which only 15% of three and four year olds managed. Pemer,
Leeham and Wimmer (1987) tested the hypothesis that the failure of three years olds
was not due to memory difficulties, failure to understand the normal expectations that
give rise to false belief or pragmatic misrepresentation of the test question. They added
memory questions to the original task and found that children were able to answer these
accurately. They compared two tasks, one, which made the expectations of the holder of
the false belief about the situation explicit, and one that did not and found that this did
not influence children's judgement. Finally they manipulated the phrases used to
question the children and found that this did not affect results.
The first studies of theory of mind in children with autism were conducted by Baron-
Cohen et al. (1985) using the Sally-Anne Task, as described on p.17. This task requires
children to understand that others can hold beliefs which are different from your own
and false. That is, whether the child understands the concept of false-belief.
The validity of these tasks has been much debated with particular consideration to the
effect of language ability, the influence of executive functioning and the relationship of
the tasks to social ability in everyday functioning. These three areas are examined
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below.
1.6.1 Theory ofMind Tasks and Language Ability.
Siegal and Beattie (1991) examined the role of pragmatic understanding in the questions
used in theory ofmind tasks. They used an equivalent task to the Sally Anne Task and
found that adding the word 'first' and asking the question 'where will Jane look first for
the kitten', greatly enhanced the understanding of the children and improved their
performance on the task. Therefore, the finding that children don't develop false belief
until around the age of four has to be treated with caution as understanding of context
and pragmatic language influences performance on these tasks.
Several studies have compared autistic children's understanding of false beliefwith the
understanding of children with language difficulties. Leslie & Frith (1988) used real life
scenarios to compare theory of mind abilities in children with difficulties in language
comprehension to autistic children and found that the children with language difficulties
performed well on false belief tasks suggesting that language problems cannot account
for the difficulties experienced by autistic children on these tasks.
Perner, Frith, Leslie & Leekam (1989) also examined autistic and language delayed
childrens' false belief understanding. They used the 'Smarties Task' where children are
shown a tube of smarties and asked what the tube contains. They are then shown that,
contrary to their belief, that it contains pencils. Thus they have experienced holding the
false belief themselves. They are then asked what another child would believe was in
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the tube. This simple task allows children to experience how a false belief can occur
before being asked to acknowledge another's false belief. Perner et al. (1989) used this
task with a group of autistic children and a group of language delayed children. Their
results were consistent with the findings of Baron-Cohen et al. (1985) and Leslie & Frith
(1988) as their autistic children had difficulty with this task and language impaired
children did not.
It has been found subsequently that language ability does affect the performance of
autistic individuals on theory ofmind tasks. Happe (1995) found that autistic children
needed better language skills to pass false belief tasks than normally developing
children.
Happe (1995) suggests that the autistic subjects were solving the tasks in a different
way, their approach may be more logical and conscious, requiring higher verbal ability.
In support for this, Happe (1995) found that autistic subjects passing second order theory
of mind tasks were able to give justifications for their answers whereas normal and
learning disabled children were not. Thus the autistic subjects may have been using
more verbal strategies.
Therefore although children with language disorders tend to pass theory of mind tasks
suggesting that language difficulties do not affect performance, there is evidence that
performance on these tasks may be affected by language skills depending on the
approach to the task.
-36-
Another area which may affect performance on theory of mind tasks and which ADHD
children have been shown to have difficulty is executive functioning
1.6.2 Theory of Mind Tasks and Executive Functioning
Russell et al. (1991) suggested that children failed false belief tasks due to an inability to
inhibit responses to a salient object. That is, these tasks require children to inhibit their
knowledge of physical reality e.g. 'the ball is in the box' and respond to the situation
using mental knowledge 'Sally thinks it is in the basket'. Russell et al. (1991) suggest
that the developmental advantage is not knowledge of mind states, but the ability to
suppress competing knowledge of physical reality, a skill requiring executive control.
An experiment involving theory of mind but not executive functioning by Bartsch &
Wellman (1989) gives support to this theory. They found when three year olds watched
a puppet search for band-aids in a band-aid box when they knew the band-aids were in
an unmarked box, 66% were able to justify correctly that the puppet thought they were
in the band-aid box. Thus a much higher percentage than the Sally Anne Task would
predict, had an appreciation of the puppets false belief.
However this is an inadequate explanation for the consistent failure of autistic children
on false belief tasks for several reasons. Firstly, false belief tasks contain a memory
question e.g. 'Where did Sally put the ball first?' If the suggestions of Russell et al.
(1991) were correct, children without the required level of executive functioning would
be likely to give an incorrect response to the memory question by responding to their
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salient physical knowledge. In the Sally Anne Task, giving the response of where the
ball is currently. However children who pass the memory question still fail on the false
belief question (Perner, et al. 1987) suggesting difficulties with false belief not executive
functioning cause failure on the task.
Secondly, further experimental evidence has shown that executive functioning deficits
fail to provide the explanation for poor performance on false belief tasks. Leslie &
Thaiss (1992) used a task called the False Photo Task to investigate executive
functioning hypothesis. This task requires a child to take a photo, with an instamatic
camera, of a doll sitting on a mat. While the photo is developing, the experimenter
moves the doll onto a box and asks where the doll will be in the photo, which is
developing. This involves inhibition of a response guided by the physical cue of the doll
being on the box and includes the unexpected transfer of an object present in false-belief
tasks but without the requirement of understanding others minds. Zaitchik (1990) found
that three-year-olds had difficulty with this task suggesting that they did not have the
executive functioning required and this would also cause failure on false-belief tasks.
Leslie & Thaiss (1992) found that almost all the children with autism in their study
passed the false photo task but failed a false belief task. This strongly suggests that EF
deficits cannot account for failure on theory of mind tasks in children with autism or
three-year-olds without autism.
1.6.3 Theory of Mind Tasks and Everyday Functioning.
As discussed above, children with autism or Asperger's syndrome often pass theory of
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mind tasks and several possible explanations have been given for this. Bowler (1992)
suggested that those passing the tasks might be using methods which don't involve
affective or emotional sub-domains. This could account for the persisting social
handicap of these children despite success on theory of mind tasks (Frith, Happe &
Siddons, 1994). In order to address this issue, Happe (1994) developed a series of
stories illustrating everyday situations where people say things that they do not literally
mean. These stories were designed to present a more naturalistic assessment where
participants would be required to consider context and have an understanding of the
characters thoughts and/ or feelings to reach a correct answer. They represented
situations such as pretending, telling a joke and using sarcasm. Happe (1994) found the
performance of those with autism on theory of mind tasks was closely related to
performance on the stories, that is those who passed second order tasks performed better
than those who passed only first order tasks, who in turn performed better than those
who failed both first and second order tasks. She interpreted this as support for the
validity of traditional theory of mind tasks. The most able autistic subjects in Happe's
study also had significantly more difficulty with the stories than either normal or
mentally handicapped controls. She suggested that this indicated that the stories
represented a more naturalistic and sensitive way of assessing theory of mind than
traditional measures.
Other studies have looked more directly at the relationship of theory of mind tasks and
social skills in everyday life. Lalonde & Chandler (1995) found that performance on
false belief tasks in three year olds was associated with their teacher's report of
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engagement in social activities involving theory ofmind e.g. playing co-operatively with
four to five children without supervision. In this study, measures of social convention
that were thought to be independent of development of theory of mind, e.g. saying
please when asking for something, were not correlated with measures of false belief.
Frith et al. (1994) found that autistic children who passed theory of mind tasks were
reported to have social behaviours in real life situations that required theory of mind.
However these children were still socially impaired relative to their age and
developmental level. Therefore, there is evidence that relates performance on theory of
mind tasks to everyday functioning. However the tasks may lack the sensitivity to
highlight those who have more subtle social impairments.
1.7 Summary
Children with ADHD have been found to have social difficulties in several areas
including identifying emotional expression and emotional content in speech (Shapiro et
al., 1993), recognising facial expression of emotion (Singh et al., 1988), social
knowledge (Grenell et al., 1987), social judgement (Whalen & Henker, 1985). They
have also been found to have pragmatic communication deficits such as poor eye contact
and observation of others' space (Clark et al., 1999). These problems may be explained
by the executive functioning deficits of children with ADHD affecting everyday
interactions or having an effect on the learning and development of these skills.
Executive functioning deficits are also found in children with autism and it has been
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hypothesised that this may account for their social difficulties (Russell et ah, 1991).
However several studies have found no link between executive functioning and the
behavioural and cognitive symptoms of autism, including theory ofmind ability.
It has been suggested theory ofmind and executive functioning are both linked with the
pre-frontal cortex, an area also linked with ADHD, and this may contribute to an
explanation of their co-occurrence (Ozonoff et ah, 1991b). However both theory of
mind and executive functioning have been linked to other areas of the brain (Happe et
ah, 1999; Lezak, 1995) and there have been several different neurological explanations
proposed for ADHD (Spreen et al., 1995). Therefore the neurological evidence is
unclear.
It has also been suggested that theory of mind is affected by social learning experience.
(Peterson and Siegel, 1995; Russell et ah, 1998). Children with ADHD have difficulties
in social interaction and therefore their exposure to learning about others mind states is
likely to be poorer than normal children.
Theory of mind has not been studied in children with ADHD and studies looking at
theory ofmind which have included children with ADHD give conflicting results.
1.8 Aims
The main aim of this study was to clarify whether or not children with ADHD had
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deficits in theory of mind. The study also aimed to examine the development of this
ability in children with ADHD and to relate this to their everyday social behaviour, with
particular reference to the behaviours seen in children with Asperger's Syndrome. This
study also aimed to examine the relationship of inhibition to performance on theory of
mind tasks and everyday social behaviour.
1.9 Hypotheses
Performance on Theory of Mind Tasks
1. More children with ADHD fail 1st and 2nd order theory of mind tasks than
children from a normal sample.
2. Children with ADHD are less competent at attributing mental states than children
in a normal sample.
Development of Theory of Mind
3. More older children with ADHD pass 1st order and 2nd order theory ofmind tasks
than younger children with ADHD.
4. Older children with ADHD are more competent at attributing mental states than
younger children with ADHD.
Theory of Mind and Verbal Comprehension
5. Failure on theory of mind and social understanding tasks is not associated with
verbal comprehension.
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Theory ofMind and Inhibition
6. Social understanding is associated with the ability to inhibit habitual responses.
Theory of Mind and Everyday Social Behaviour
7. Children with ADHD are reported by their parents to have a similar pattern of




A cross-sectional design was used to investigate the performance of children with
ADHD on theory of mind tasks and parental report of behaviours associated with
Asperger's Syndrome.
The participants' scores were compared with data from previous studies and
differences on performance were investigated across ages.
Within subjects comparisons were made comparing theory of mind tasks to a
measure of verbal comprehension and a measure of inhibition of response.
Descriptive statistics were used to examine the responses in a parent rated
questionnaire.
2.2 Participants
All participants were current or past patients of the Department of Child and Family
Psychiatry, Royal Aberdeen Children's Hospital (RACH). All children had been
given a diagnosis ofADHD by a consultant psychiatrist.
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2.2.1 Inclusion Criteria
To be included in the study the children had to meet the following criteria:
1. Between ages of five and twelve years inclusive.
2. A primary diagnosis ofADHD
3. A verbal comprehension age equivalent of five years or more
2.2.2 Exclusion Criteria
Children who had a diagnosis ofAsperger's Syndrome or autism were excluded from
the study.
2.2.3. Recruitment
Based on the above criteria, suitable participants were identified by consultant
psychiatrists from RACH and their parents/ guardians were contacted by letter
inviting participation (Appendix 2). They were sent an information sheet (Appendix
3) and a consent form (Appendix 4). Parents were asked to indicate where they
would prefer their child to be seen, given the choice of school, home or at the
Department of Child Clinical Psychology, RACH. Once consent was received,
arrangements were made to see the child.
2.3 Ethical Approval
Ethical Approval was granted by Grampian Research Ethics Committee.
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2.4 Materials
Each child was assessed using the following tasks:
1st order theory ofmind.
This ability was assessed using two false-belief tasks. The Smarties Task (Perner,
Frith, Leslie & Leekam, 1989) involves using a smarties tube and some pencils as
visual prompts for questions asked about others beliefs. The Sally Anne Task
(Baron-Cohen, 1989) involves the acting out of a scenario using two rag dolls, a
basket a box and a ball.
Control Task.
In addition, those who failed the Sally Anne Task were given the False Photo Task
(Zaitchik, 1990). This task was used to control for failure on the Sally Anne Task due
to difficulty inhibiting salient response. Success on this task requires suppression of
a response about the true position of an object but without the involvement of a false
belief. A doll, mat, camera and box are used to visually represent the task to the
child.
2nd order theory ofmind.
The Ice-Cream Van Task (Baron-Cohen, 1989) was used to examine 2nd order theory
of mind. In this task a scenario involving toy figures and an ice-cream van is
explained to the children as the figures are manipulated to represent the story. The
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story takes place in a toy village where there are houses, a church and a park
represented by two toy trees.
Social Understanding.
The Strange Stories (Happe, 1994) were used to assess children's understanding of
particular social situations. The stories are a collection of scenarios in which
characters say things they do not mean literally. To be understood correctly they
require understanding that people do not say what is literally true when they lie, tell
white lies, joke, pretend, misunderstand another, persuade someone, use a figure of
speech, appear to be what they are not, are sarcastic, forget, have contrary emotions
or engage in double bluff. Each story describes one of these 12 situations (Appendix
5).
British Picture Vocabulary Scale (Short Form) (Dunn, Dunn & Whetton, 1985).
The British Picture Vocabulary Scale (BPVS) is intended as a measure of receptive
vocabulary. It was not intended as a test of general intelligence. The BPVS, short
form was standardised on 3334 randomly selected school pupils from the ages of 3
years to 18 years 11 months. The internal consistency of the test was examined by
calculating split-half reliability. The median value for split-half reliability was 0.8
with a range of 0.41 to 0.86 (Dunn et al., 1985). The authors do not provide
statistical evidence for the validity of the BPVS. They justify content validity by
pointing out the selection of words aiming to cover a wide breadth of vocabulary
whilst being relevant to children. They also point to the validity of more established
tests using hearing vocabulary e.g. Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children -
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Revised (Wechsler, 1974) and the finding that vocabulary correlates highly with full
scale IQ (Wechsler, 1974) as evidence that the BPVS measures scholastic aptitude.
This measure was used as a screening task to ensure that the children had sufficient
language skills to understand the experimental tasks.
Stroop Neuropsychological Screening Test (SNST) (Trenerry, Crosson, DeBoe &
Leber, 1989).
The SNST is one of many versions of the Stroop procedure initiated by Stroop
(1935) who discovered that people when asked to name colour names printed in ink
of a different colour did so much slower than if they were asked to name colour of
square patches of ink (Lezak, 1995). The exact neuropsychological function the
Stroop measures is debated however it is most commonly used in neuropsychological
assessment as a measure of ability to inhibit response or ability to selectively attend
to stimuli (Lezak, 1995).
The test-retest reliability of scores in the colour-word task has been examined over
60 days (Trenerry et al., 1989) and a correlation of 0.9 was found between the 1st and
2nd administration. Trenerry et al. (1989) found that brain injured subjects had
significantly poorer scores on the SNST than a normal sample and the scores of the
brain injured sample correlated with scores on other neuropsychological tests e.g.
Weshler Adult Intelligence Scale - Revised (Weshler, 1981).
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The SHST is standardised on adults aged 18 years and over and not on children.
However this version was used primarily because it was an available resource and
the researcher was unable to obtain other versions given the time constraints. It was
also intended only for a between groups measurement therefore did not require
normative data for comparison.
Australian Scale for Asperger's Syndrome (Garnett & Attwood, 1995; Attwood,
1998).
This questionnaire was devised for use as a screening questionnaire for Asperger's
Syndrome. It was designed to identify children who show more abnormal social and
emotional behaviour than would be normally expected. The questionnaire
incorporates behaviours of children with Asperger's Syndrome as specified in
diagnostic criteria and found in research studies (Garnett & Attwood, 1995). The
questionnaire is divided into five sections incorporating impairments in social and
emotional functioning, cognitive skills, communication skills, specific interests and
motor skills. It contains 24 items questions are rated on a scale of zero to six with
zero indicating that the child never engages in the behaviour and six indicated the
behaviour is frequently present. The questionnaire has not been standardised on the
normal population. Garnett & Attwood (1995) validated the questionnaire by
comparing the scores of children referred for assessment of Asperger's Syndrome
received a diagnosis with those referred for Asperger's Syndrome who did not
receive a diagnosis and a sample of normal children. Significant differences were
found between the normal control group and the diagnosed Asperger's Syndrome
group on each question. However the questionnaire did not discriminate
-49-
significantly over all between the Asperger's Syndrome group and the clinically
referred group without subsequent diagnosis. A discriminate analysis of the
questions revealed four questions that appeared to distinguish those who went on to
be diagnosed as having Asperger's Syndrome. These were a preference of reading
information only rather than fiction, a literal interpretation of comments, a
fascination with a particular topic and a lack of subtlety in their expression if
emotion. Attwood (1998) suggests a score of 2 or more on the majority of questions
indicates further assessment for Asperger's Syndrome should be pursued. However
this is just a suggested guide and there has been no statistical validation of this
suggestion. Thus the authors propose it as a screening tool but warn that it is not
sensitive enough to discriminate Asperger's Syndrome from behaviours that present
superficially as Asperger's Syndrome in a clinical population.
See Appendix 6 for a copy of the questionnaire.
2.5 Procedure
Place of testing.
The children were tested in a quiet room. The majority of children were seen on
their own. One child wished to have a parent present, one parent wished to be
present and one teacher wished to be present. Where adults other than the
experimenter were present, they did not contribute to the assessment.
The tasks were administered to each child in the order presented below.
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Smarties Task (Appendix 7).
The child was shown a tube of smarties and asked 'What do you think is in here?'
(the child answers 'Smarties'). The tube was then opened to reveal pencils and the
experimenter said 'No, look there are pencils'. The experimenter put the pencils
back in the tube and replaced the lid. The child was then asked the reality question
'What's in here?' to ascertain that they know what was really in the box and the
memory question 'When I first asked you, what did you say?' to check that they
remember their own initial response. The child was then asked what their teacher/
friend or parent would say if they were asked what is in the box (the false belief
question). The child was then asked a further reality check question 'Is that what's
really in the box?' and another memory question 'When I first asked you what was in
this box, what did you say?'
Children were required to answer all questions including the false belief question
correctly to pass the test.
Sally Anne Task (Appendix 8).
Children were introduced to two rag dolls 'This is Sally and this is Anne' and their
attention draw to a basket and box on the table. The experimenter said 'Sally has a
ball. She puts the ball in the basket.' The experimenter manipulated Sally putting the
ball in the basket. 'She goes away'. Sally was put out of sight. 'Anne takes the ball
and puts it in the box'. The experimenter manipulated Anne putting the ball in the
box. 'Now Sally comes back'. This sequence is illustrated in Figure 2.1. The child
was then asked the false beliefquestion, 'Where will Sally look first for the ball?'.
If they answer this question correctly the following two control questions were
asked: 'Where is the ball really?' To ensure the child knows the real current
location of the ball and 'Where did Sally put the ball first?' To ensure the child
remembered the previous location.
Figure 2.1 Sequence of the Sally Anne Task
Sally puts the ball in the basket Anne takes the ball and puts it in the box.
Sally conies back
To pass the test the child had to answer all three questions correctly. If the child
failed the test, the False Photo task was administered to control for failure due to
inability to inhibit response.
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False Photo Task (Appendix 9).
A doll was placed on a mat beside a box. The child was helped to take a photo of the
doll and the experimenter then moved the doll onto the box, as illustrated in Figure
2.2. The child was asked 'In the photo, where will the doll be?'. If the child answers
wrongly 'On the box' this suggests that the child is responding to current
environmental cues this could account for failure on the Sally Anne task. Answering
correctly 'On the mat' indicates the child is able to suppress the impulse to say what
they see and failure on the Sally Anne task is likely to be due to inability to
appreciate another's false belief.
If the child failed the False Photo task their scores were excluded from analysis on
the Sally Anne Task and the Ice-Cream Van Task.
Figure 2.2 Sequence of the False Photo Task
The child takes a photo of the doll on the mat. The doll is placed on the box
Ice-Cream Van Task.
The story was acted out using model figures which were manipulated by the
experimenter as the story was being told. It can be divided into four episodes:
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Episode 1: Mary and John see the ice-cream van in the park.
Episode 2: Mary goes home for some money, and meanwhile the ice-cream van
man tells John he is going to the church.
Episode 3: Mary unexpectedly sees the ice-cream man who tells her he is going
to the church.
Episode 4: John sets out to look for Mary whom, he is told by Mary's Mum, has
gone to buy ice-cream.
These four episodes are illustrated in Figure 2.3.
Figure 2.3 Sequence of the Ice-Cream Van Task
Mary goes home and the ice-cream man tells
Mary sees the ice-cream man who says he is John calls atMary's and her Mum says she
on the way to the church. has gone to buy ice-cream
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Children were asked the false belief question 'Where does John think Mary has gone
to buy ice-cream?'
The children were also asked eight control questions throughout the story to ensure
they understand and remember what is happening in the story (see Appendix 10 for
full script).
To pass the test, the children had to answer all the control questions and the false
belief question correctly. If the child failed the false belief question, they are
included in analysis only if they passed all the control questions.
Strange Stories.
Informal observation of the first four subjects indicated that children often began to
get agitated around story 10. It was clear that the time taken to read all twenty four
stories would require concentration and attention which the subjects may not be able
to sustain. Twelve of the twenty-four Strange Stories were used in this study
(Appendix 5).
Children were given the stories to follow while the tester read out loud. If the child
began to read the story aloud, they were stopped and asked to follow it to themselves.
The children had the relevant story in front of them throughout testing and were
allowed to refer to it. Before reading the stories the children were informed that they
could ask questions about the story or have it re-read if they wished. After each
story, the child was asked two (sometimes three) test questions.
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1. A comprehension question. This question asked ifwhat the character had said
in the story was true. The purpose of this question was to ensure that the
child had understood the story. If they responded wrongly to this question
the experimenter questioned their answer e.g. 'Is it really a pirate ship?' then
relevant parts of the story or the complete story was read again until the child
responded correctly or they gave a justification for their wrong answer.
2. The justification question. This question asked why the characters said what
they said. Children were given as much time as they wished to respond.
The method of this study differed from Happe's (1994) administration in that the
children were prompted if their answers were unclear or appeared incomplete. Only
the responses before prompting were included in the data analysis.
The Strange Stories were scored according to the guidelines outlined in Happe
(1994). The justifications for the story characters' utterances were rated as correct or
incorrect. Responses were incorrect if they were factually incorrect or indicated a
misunderstanding of the characters' intentions e.g. In the White Lie story where
Peter dislikes his aunt's hat but comments that it is very nice, the response 'he said
she looks nice in her old hat' would be factually incorrect and the response 'it was
just a joke' would indicate a misunderstanding.
Both correct and incorrect justifications were rated as either involving descriptions of
mental or physical states. An justification was classed as mental if it involved
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reference to thoughts, feelings, desires, traits and dispositions (Happe, 1994) e.g.
like, want, pretend, lie, happy, cross think. Justifications were recorded as physical
when they involved physical appearance, action of objects, physical events,
outcomes (Happe, 1994) e.g. looks like, because she is (action), to not get (physical
outcome).
Scores were given for the best answer. That is, credit would be given for the right
answer even if a wrong answer was given too and a mental state justification would
be scored if both a physical and mental justification were given.
To increase the accuracy of scoring, the responses to the stories were recorded on
tape, providing the child had no objection. The responses, including the researchers
prompts, were transcribed verbatim onto response sheets.
The responses were rated independently by two raters, to increase the reliability of
scoring. Table 2.1 shows the percentage of concordance between the raters for each
story type.
British Picture Vocabulary Scale (Short Form).
The BPVS was administered according to the instructions in the manual (Dunn et al.,
1985). The children were asked to point to one of four pictures indicating the word
that the experimenter had just said. Testing finished when the child failed on four
out of six items in succession or on reaching the final, 32nd item.
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Table 2.1 Percentage of concordance on each story type ofjustifications judged as right/ wrong and
physical/ mental.
Story Type Concordance on Right/ Wrong
Justifications (%)




White Lie 97 92
Joke 97 94
Misunderstanding 97 100
Figure of Speech 97 97
Sarcasm 86 97
Double Bluff 94 100
Persuasion 97 97
Contrary Emotion 94 100
Appearance/ Reality 100 100
Forget 97 92
Stroop Neuropsychological Screening Test.
This test was administered according to the instructions given in the manual
(Trenerry et al., 1989). In the version used, participants were asked to read a list of
words in coloured ink different from that described by the word. They are then
asked to name the colours on a second sheet of words printed in ink of a different
colour. Both tasks were administered although the data from the first task was not
used. The authors suggest the first task may have a priming effect and therefore is
necessary when comparison with other studies using the same instructions. However
since only between group measurements were being assessed in this case, this task
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was of little experimental use. It was however an easy task for the children to
complete and therefore was used to help introduce the child to the task. It also
highlighted children who had difficulty reading the words (e.g. did not recognise the
words immediately or needed to spell out the words to read them). The scores of
these children were then eliminated from the analysis as their lack of reading
comprehension would reduce the inhibitory effect of the words on the second task.
Australian Scale for Asperger's Syndrome.
The parent or guardian of each child was asked to complete the questionnaire. The
parents of those children seen in school were sent the questionnaire, to return by
post, along with notification of the day and time arranged with the school. Those
whose children were seen at home or attended the psychology department were given
the questionnaire to complete while the child was seen for the study. Three parents
did not return the questionnaire, therefore 42 questionnaires were used in the study.
2.6 Data Analysis
The participating ADHD children were divided into three age groups: 6-8 years, 9-
10 years, 11-12 years. This was to allow comparison with other studies using these
age groupings when assessing non-ADHD children on 1st and 2nd order theory of
mind tasks.
The data were analysed using SPSS Version 10.05 for Windows. Chi-Squared tests
were used to compare the nominal data from the 1st and 2nd order theory of mind
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tasks. Where assumptions of skewness, kurtosis and homogeneity of variance were
met, parametric statistics were used. In one instance, only summary data were
available for comparison with a normal group. In this case a separate variance t-test
was used to compare standard deviations and means. Otherwise, non-parametric
analyses were used to compare independent samples. Since the examination of all





Fifty-One children participated in this study. Following testing, six children were
excluded. Two children were excluded because they had an estimated verbal
comprehension age of less than five years. A further four children were excluded
after subsequent discussion with clinician revealed co-morbid diagnosis of autism or
Asperger's Syndrome. Therefore 45 children were included in the analysis for this
study.
3.1.1 Age
The age of subjects ranged from 6 years 9 months to 12 years 11 months (m = 10
years 4 months; sd = 1 year 9 months).
For comparison with other studies, the subjects were divided into three age groups as
shown in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1 Summary Data ofAge Groups ofADHD Children
Age range mean sd
6yrs 9mths - 8yrs 9mths 7yrs 9mths 8mths
9yrs 3mths - lOyrs 1 lmths 1 Oyrs 2 Mths 6mths
1 lyrs Omths - 12yrs 1 lmths 1 lyrs 1 lmths 8mths
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3.1 Theory of Mind and Children with ADHD
3.1.1 First Order Theory of Mind
All the ADHD children passed the Smarties Task. Two children failed the Sally
Anne Task, one of these children also failed the False Photo Task and therefore the
data of this child was excluded from the analysis of this task. The data from the
Smarties Task and the Sally Anne Task is shown in Table 3.2. The performance of
ADHD children on these tasks was compared with the results of Muris et al. (1999).
The data from Muris et al. (1999) is presented in Table 3.3.
Table 3.2 First Order Theory of Mind Tasks: ADHD children.
6-8yrs 9-10yrs ll-12yrs Total
N % N % N % N %
Smarties Pass 11 100 15 100 19 100 45 100
3II L/i Fail 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SallyAnne Pass 11 100 14 93 19 100 44 98
^3"IIC Fail 0 0 1 7 0 0 1 2
Table 3.3 First Order Theory ofMind Tasks: Non-ADHD children (Muris et al., 1999).
7-8yrs 9-10yrs ll-12yrs Total
N % N % N % N %
Smarties Pass 19 95 20 100 10 100 49 98
3II O Fail 1 5 0 0 0 0 1 0
SallyAnne Pass 14 70 19 95 mm 80 41 82
ok/DIIc Fail 6 30 1 5 2 20 9 18
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There was no significant difference between the number ofADHD children and non-
ADHD children (Muris et al., 1999) passing the Smarties Task (1) = 0.10, NS).
Significantly more children with ADHD passed the Sally Anne Task than the
children in Muris et al.'s normal sample (% (1) = 8.76, p<01).
Muris et al. (1999) had a higher percentage of children in their younger age group,
40% compared with 23% in the ADHD sample. The difference between the ADHD
and non-ADHD children was not attributable to differences in age groups numbers.
(X2(4) = 6.98, NS.).
3.2.2 Second Order Theory of Mind
75% of the children with ADHD passed the Ice-Cream Van Task. 30% of 7-8yr olds
failed the Ice-Cream Van Task, as did 31% of 9-10yr olds and 21% of 11-12yr olds
(Table 3.4).
Table 3.4 Ice-cream Van Task: ADHD and Non-ADHD Children
Data for non-ADHD children taken from Muris et al. (1999).
7-8yrs 9-10yrs ll-12yrs Total
N % N % N % N %
ADHD Pass 7 70 11 69 15 79 33 75
n=44 Fail 3 30 5 31 3 21 11 25
Non-
ADHD
Pass 18 90 18 90 9 90 45 90
n=50 Fail 2 10 2 10 1 10 5 10
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A significant difference was found between ADHD and non-ADHD children (x2 (1)
= 4.48, p<.05). The performance of children on the Ice-Cream Van task is illustrated
in Figure 3.1. More children with ADHD, than non-ADHD children, failed the Ice-
Cream Van Task in each age group.
Figure 3.1 Pie Chart ofADHD and Non-ADHD Children Passing and Failing the Ice-Cream Van
Task
Performance of ADHD and Non-ADHD




Chart shows percentage of children
3.2.3 Strange Stories
The scores of the child excluded from analysis of the Sally-Anne Task and the Ice-
Cream Van Task, due to failure of the False Photo Task, were included in this
analysis.
The box plot in Figure 3.2 indicates the spread of scores, out of 12, on the Strange
Stories. Two of the children made only one correct justification to the stories and
one child made only three correct justifications. The results profile of these children
is detailed at the end ofthe results section.
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The current study used 12 stories instead of 24 for reasons explained in the method
section. The scores of the children with ADHD were doubled to allow comparison
with data from Happe (1994) (Table 3.5)





Table 3.5 Strange Stories Summary Data: ADHD and Non-ADHD children
Data for non-ADHD children from Happe (1994).
Total Score Correct Justifications
(max. = 24) Mental Physical
ADHD Mean 18.8 14.2 4.62
n=45 SD 5.3 5.31 3.56
Range 2-24 0-22 0-18
Non-ADHD Mean 21.0 16.7 4.4
n=26 SD 3.0 3.1 1.9
Range 11-24 10-22 1-9
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The mean and standard deviation of the number of correct justifications made by
children with ADHD was compared with that ofHappe's sample of normal children
and found to be significantly different (t= 2.23; df=69; p<.05). The mean number of
correct justifications of the children with ADHD was less than that of Happe's
normal sample of children.
Mental Justifications
The mean and standard deviation of the number of correct mental justifications made
by the children with ADHD were compared to those in the normal sample of children
ofHappe (1994) and a significant difference found (t=2.5; df=69; p<.05). The mean
number of correct mental justifications of children with ADHD was less than that of
Happe's sample.
Figure 3.3 Box Plot ofADHD Children's Correct Mental Justifications
The box plot in Figure 3.3Mental Justifications to the Strange Stories
ADHD Children's Scores indicates the spread of
correct mental justifications
(maximum = 12) given by
the ADHD children. One of
the children made only one
correct justification and one
child did not make any
-66-
correct justifications.
Profile ofquestions answered incorrectly on the Strange Stories
Table 3.6 shows the number and percentage of ADHD children giving incorrect
responses for each of Strange Stories. The three stories that elicited the most
incorrect justifications were Double Bluff (38%), Contrary Emotion (27%) and
Figure of Speech (24%). The stories that elicited the least incorrect responses were
Lie (2%) and Forgetting (2%).
Table 3.6 Incorrect responses ofADHD children to the Strange Stories
Story Type IncorrectMental Incorrect Physical Total Incorrect
Justifications Justifications Justifications
n % n % n %
Pretend 3 7 2 4 5 11
Lie IHH 2 0 0 1 2
White Lie 3 7 2 4 5 11
Joke IBHfli 4 2 HUH 9
Misunderstanding 6 13 1 2 7 16
Figure of Speech 6 13 5 mmgm 11 24
Sarcasm 6 13 3 i 9 20
Double Bluff 14 31 3 HHHI 17
Persuasion 3 7 0 0 3 7
Contrary Emotion 10 22 wmSjam 4 12 27
Appearance/ reality 1 2 3 7 4 9
Forgetting M 0 HHHII■■■MM jBHHHf
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Prompts on the Strange Stories
In Happe's study, prompting was not used and therefore the performance of the
ADHD children was scored before prompting, to allow comparison with her
findings. However prompting was used in the current study. Since standard prompts
were not decided before testing, there was not sufficient control over this variable to
interpret the responses after prompts meaningfully. However, it is noted that 12
(27%) of the children gave answers following the prompts which would have
increased their score on the Strange Stories by one or more.
3.2.4 Ice-Cream Van Task and Strange Stories
ADHD children were separated into two groups on the basis of their performance on
the Ice-Cream Van Task: those who passed and those who failed this task. The
number of correct justifications made by the children in these two groups were
compared using a Mann-Whitney test. No significant association between
performance on Ice-Cream Van Task and correct answers on Strange Stories (z =
1.707, NS). The percentage of children for each score on the Strange Stories,
grouped according to those who passed and those who failed the Ice-Cream Van
Task, is illustrated in Figure 3.4.
The number ofmental state justifications in response to the Strange Stories given by
the children who failed the Ice-Cream Van task was compared to the mental state
justifications given by those who passed.
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Figure 3.4 Bar Chart of Scores on the Strange Stories ofChildren who Passed or Failed the lee-
Cream Van Task
Performance on the Strange Stories
and Ice-Cream Van Task
0
Q_
1 3 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Number of Correct Justifications
A significant difference was found between the number of correct mental
justifications given by those who passed and the number given by those who failed,
(z = 2.80, p<.01). Those who passed gave more correct mental state justifications.
Figure 3.5 Bar chart of the Number of Correct Mental Justifications Given by Children who Passed or
Failed the Ice-Cream Van Task
Strange Stories (Mental Justifications)
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Figure 3.5 shows the
percentage of children




those who passed and
those who failed the Ice-
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Cream Van task.
3.3 Development of theory of mind in children with ADHD.
3.3.1 Ice Cream Van Task
Figure 3.6 shows the spread of ages of those who passed and those who failed the
Ice-Cream Van Task. No significant differences were found between the two groups
(t=0.68, dfi=43, NS).
3.3.2 Strange Stories
Age was not associated with number of correct justifications made on the Strange
Stories (r=0.29, n=45, NS) or number of correct mental justifications (r=0.13, n=45,
NS).
Figure 3.6 Box plot ofAges ofChildren who Passed and Failed the Ice-Cream Van Task
Ice-Cream Van Task















3.4 BPVS and Theory of Mind
The children with ADHD had a mean estimated verbal comprehension score on the
BPVS of 95.9, a standard deviation of 14.33 and a range of 61 to 137. The
standardised mean for the BPVS is 100 with a standard deviation of 15.
3.4.1. Performance of ADHD children on Strange Stories and BPVS
Pearson's correlation revealed an association between verbal comprehension and
performance on the Strange Stories (r = 0.41, n=45, p< .01, two-tailed)). This is
illustrated in Figure 3.7. An association was also found between scores on the BPVS
and number of correct mental justifications given to the Strange Stories (r=0.45,
n=45, p<.01, two-tailed)
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3.4.2 Performance of ADHD children on Ice-Cream Van Task and BPVS
Those children who failed the Ice-Cream Van Task did not have significantly
different verbal comprehension scores than those who passed (t=1.56, df=43, NS).
3.5 Stroop and Theory of Mind
The score on the Stroop represents the number of correct responses given in two
minutes. Thus, the higher the score the better the performance.
3.5.1 Performance of ADHD children on the Stroop and Strange Stories
The performance of the ADHD children on the Strange Stories was compared with
their performance on the Stroop (Figure 3.8).
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Pearson's correlation revealed positive association between performance on the
Stroop and number of correct justifications on the Strange Stories (r = 0.45, n=41,
Strange Stories and Stroop
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p<.01, two tailed) and a positive association between performance on the Stroop and
number of correct mental justifications (r=0.36, n=41, p<.05, two tailed).
3.5.2 Performance of ADHD children on Ice-Cream Van Task and Stroop
There was not a significant difference in performance on the Stroop between those
who failed and those who passed the Ice-Cream Van Task (t=l .67, df=39, NS).
3.5.3 Performance on the Stroop and BPVS
Performance on the Stroop was not associated with verbal comprehension (r=0.12,
n=41, NS).
3.5.4 Performance on the Stroop and Age
An association was found between performance on the Stroop and Age (r=0.48,
n=41, p<.01, two tailed). This is illustrated in Figure 3.9.















3.6 Behaviours associated with Asperger's Syndrome in children with
ADHD
3.6.1. Parent ratings of children with ADHD on the Australian Scale for
Asperger's Syndrome
Table 3.7 shows the percentage of children who were rated as showing the
behaviours described in each question as 'frequently', that is scores of 4-6. See
Appendix 6 for questions.
Table 3.7 Percentage of Parents Giving a Rating of 'Frequently' for Each Question.
Question 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
% 45 7 60 50 43 64 69 52 29 21 33 14
Question 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
% 50 50 12 48 26 45 19 31 40 17 26 14
Seven of the behaviours in the questionnaire were rated as 'frequent' by 50% or
more of the parents. These are illustrated in Table 3.8.
All of the questions had a rating of'frequent' by three or more parents (7%).
- 74-
Table 3.8 Questions Rated as 'Frequent' by Over 50% of Parents
Social and Emotional Communication Frequency (%)
Does the child lack subtlety in their expression of emotion? 69
Does the child need excessive amount of reassurance, especially if things are
changed or go wrong?
64
Does the child appear unaware of social conventions or codes of conduct and
make inappropriate actions and comments?
60
Does the child lack precision in their expression of emotion? 52




When talking to the child does he or she appear uninterested in your side of the
conversation?
50
When in a conversation, does the child tend to use less eye contact than you
would expect?
50
As outlined in the method, Attwood (1998) suggests further investigation of the
possibility of Asperger's Syndrome if the majority of questions are scored two or
more. The stem and leaf plot in Figure 3.10 looks at the frequency of questions
scored two or over Australian Scale for Asperger's Syndrome. The stem (central
column) gives the leading digits (tens) of the number of questions rated 2-6 and the
leafgives the units of the number of questions scored 2-6.
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Figure 3.10 Stem and Leaf Plot of Number of Children Given Ratings of Two or More on the
Majority of Questions of the Australian Scale for Asperger's Syndrome
Frequency Stem & Leaf
4.00 0 . 0023
3.00 0 . 899
9.00 1 . 001112334
13.00 1 . 5555566778899
13.00 2 . 0012223334444
Stem width: 10.00
Each leaf: 1 case(s)
Of the 42 out of 45 questionnaires that were returned, 29 of the parents (69%) rated
the majority of answers (over 12 questions) between two and six. Only two of the
children did not have ratings of 2 or more on any of the behaviours in the
questionnaire.
3.6.2 Australian Scale for Asperger's Syndrome and Age
Age and score on Australian Scale for Aspergers' were positively correlated (r=0.38,
n=42, NS). This is illustrated in Figure 3.11. When the association of age with the
sections of the questionnaire were examined, age was found to correlate with
positively with Social and Emotional Behaviour (r=0.34, n=42, p<.05) and positively
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with Interests (r=0.38, n=42, p<.05) but did not correlate with Communication
(i=0.28, n=42, NS) or Cognitive Skills (r=0.21, n=42, NS).
Figure 3.11 Scatter Plot of Scores on the Australian Scale for Asperger's Syndrome and Age
Australian Scale for Asperger's



















3.6.3 Australian Scale for Asperger's Syndrome and performance on Strange
Stories
Using Pearsons correlation, no significant associations were found between the
Australian Scale for Asperger's Syndrome and the children's overall performance on
the Strange Stories (r = 0.03, n = 42, NS) or the number of correct mental
justifications given by the children (r = -0.13, n = 42, NS).
3.6.4 Australian Scale for Asperger's Syndrome and Stroop
There was no association between total score on the questionnaire and score on the
Stroop (r = 0.20, n = 41, NS).
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3.7 Outliers on the Strange Stories
Two of the children made only one correct justification to the stories and one child
made only three justifications. The results profile of these children and additional
information is examined below.
3.7.1 Case 1
Age: 7 years and 5 months Sex: Female
Theory ofMind. This child passed the 1st order theory of mind tasks but failed the
Ice-Cream Van Task.
Strange Stories. This child scored a total ofone correct justification. She attended to
the stories with prompting but frequently missed the main point of the story. For
example, in the story illustrating misunderstanding (Appendix 5), she answered 'No'
to the question 'Was the policeman surprised by what the burglar did?' and justified
this by saying 'Because his hands were cold'. Thus not attending to or understanding
the content of the story and/ or the thoughts of the characters.
Use ofMental Justifications. This child gave one correct mental justification but
used a total of seven mental justifications (six were incorrect). Of the six incorrect
justifications, five of these were justified in terms of what the characters 'wanted'
e.g. 'He didn't want to get into trouble', 'She wants to go out on the picnic'.
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Verbal Ability. This child had a verbal comprehension score of 90.
Attention and Inhibition. Throughout testing this child needed prompting to stay on
task and was frequently distracted by other items in the room (e.g. papers, felt pens).
She obtained a score of 10 on the Stroop which is more than three standard
deviations below the sample mean (m = 67.5; sd = 18.3). She had difficulty retaining
the aim of the task, reverting to saying the word instead of the colour after the 10th
item.
Unfortunately the parental questionnaire was not returned for this child and therefore
there is no information about her everyday social behaviour. The head teacher of her
school commented that she had difficulties interacting with both children and adults.
3.7.2 Case 2
Age: 10 years and 11 months Sex: Male
Theory ofMind. This child passed the Smarties Task but failed the Sally Anne Task
and the False Photo Task. He also failed the Ice-Cream Van Task but gave correct
responses to the control questions.
Strange Stories. This child gave one correct justification. He needed prompting to
help clarify his understanding of the stories. He frequently repeated the content of the
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story as a strategy for answering the question e.g. in the first story, Pretend
(Appendix 5), he gave the justification 'because he's paddling along'.
Use ofMenial Justifications. This child gave four mental justifications, one of which
was correct. Again, these justifications were taken from the text of the stories e.g. in
the story involving contrary emotion, he gave the justification 'because she said to
her Mum she was sad she didn't win'.
Verbal Ability. This child had a verbal comprehension score of 74 this is more than
one standard deviation below the standardised norm (m = 100, sd = 15). His BPVS
score estimated his verbal ability at an age equivalent of 7 years and 9 months, 2
years and 2 months below his chronological age.
Attention and Inhibition. This child concentrated well on all the tasks.
Unfortunately due to experimenter error, the responses to the Stroop were lost in this
case.
The parental questionnaire for this child was not returned.
3.7.3 Case 3
Age: 10 years 11 months Sex: Male
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Theory ofMind. This child passed the Smarties Task, failed the Sally Anne Task,
passed the False Photo Task and failed the Ice-Cream Van Task.
Strange Stories. This child gave three correct justifications, two of them mental. He
had a distinctive and repetitive pattern of answering. He responded 'No, it's false' to
each of the comprehension questions and needed prompting to ensure comprehension
of the stories. He gave responses which indicated a literal interpretation of the
stories e.g. In the story illustrating figure of speech, he asserted 'That's not right, the
frog's not in her throat' and in the story involving sarcasm, he responded' 'It's not
sunny, it's false' (that Sarah says it's a nice day).
Use ofMental Justifications. He gave four mental justifications for the stories, two
of which were correct. Two of these answers were taken from the content of the
story e.g. in the story about contrary emotion, he responded 'she was sad'.
VerbalAbility. This child had a verbal comprehension score of 61, which is over two
standard deviations below the norm (m = 100, sd = 15). This estimates his ability at
an age equivalent of 6yrs and 3mths, 4yrs and lOmths below his chronological age.
Attention and Inhibition. This child attended well to the tasks. He had a score of 74
on the Stroop which was within one standard deviation from the sample mean (m =
67.5 s.d. = 18.3).
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Australian Scale for Asperger's Syndrome. This child was rated as 'frequently'
showing 15 of the 24 behaviours listed which are associated with Asperger's
Syndrome. Six of the 'other characteristics' were indicated including unusual fear
or distress due to ordinary sounds or noisy, crowded places.
The profile of results for Cases 1,2 and 3 is summarised in Table 3.9.
Table 3.9 Summary of Results of Outliers on the Strange Stories
Task Case 1 Case 2 Case 3
Smarties Pass Pass Pass
Sally Anne Pass Fail Fail
False Photo N/A Fail Pass
Ice-Cream Van Fail Fail Fail
Strange Stories
Correct Justifications 1 1 3
Correct Mental Justifications 1 1 2
BPVS 90 74 61
Stroop 10 Not recorded 74
Australian Scales for Asperger's Syndrome Not returned Not returned 15
Number of questions rated 2-6
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CHAPTER 4: DISCUSSION
This study aimed to examine theory of mind in children with ADHD. The children
were assessed using 1st and 2nd order theory of mind tasks and a battery of stories
requiring understanding of character's mind states. The children's verbal
comprehension was measured using the BPVS and their ability to inhibit habitual
response was assessed using the Stroop. The children's parents were asked to
complete a questionnaire ofbehaviours commonly seen in Asperger's Syndrome.
4.1 Summary of Findings
The main findings of this study were:
i. Children with ADHD performed equally well on one 1st order theory ofmind
task and significantly better on another than a normal sample.
ii. Significantly more children with ADHD failed a 2nd order theory ofmind task
than a normal sample.
iii. When justifying characters utterances in the Strange Stories, children with
ADHD gave significantly fewer correct justifications and used significantly
fewer correct mental state justifications than children in a normal sample.
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IV. There was no association between the age of the children with ADHD and
their performance on 1st order or 2nd order theory of mind tasks or on the
Strange Stories.
v. ADHD children's performance on the Strange Stories was positively
associated with their performance on the BPVS. The number of correct
mental state justifications given was also positively associated with the
children's score on the BPVS.
vi. There was a significant association between ADHD children's performance
on the Stroop and their performance on the Strange Stories. Those who had
lower scores on the Stroop gave fewer correct justifications to the stories and
fewer correct mental justifications. There was no significant difference on
performance on the Stroop between those who passed or those who failed the
Ice-Cream Van Task. Performance on the Stroop improved with age.
vii. On a questionnaire of behaviours commonly found in children with
Asperger's Syndrome, seven of the behaviours were rated as frequently
observed in their child by 50% or more of the parents of children with
ADHD. Overall score on the questionnaire was not associated with
performance on the Strange Stories and there was no association between any
of the sub-sections of the questionnaire and performance on the Strange
Stories. There was an association between over all score on the questionnaire
and age, with older children being given higher ratings. This association was
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mainly accounted for in the correlation between the Social and Emotional
Behaviour section and age and the Interests section and age.
The above findings are now discussed in relation to the hypotheses proposed in the
introduction. The theoretical and clinical implications of the findings are then
considered. Finally, the methodology of this study and indications for further
research are reviewed.
4.2 Discussion ofHypotheses
The hypotheses are numbered as they are in the introduction.
1. More children with ADHD fail 1st order and 2nd order theory of mind
tasks than children from a normal sample.
1st order tasks.
The children with ADHD in this sample performed equally well to the comparison
study (Muris et al., 1999) on the Smarties task and significantly better on the Sally
Anne Task. One possible explanation for this difference is disparity in the
methodology of the two studies . Comparison with children used in a separate study
meant that there was no control over methodological differences. One
methodological disparity was that the children in Muris et al.'s study (1999) were not
given a control task to eliminate the possibility that the reason for failure was due to
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a response to environmental cues. Although, it is unlikely that children in a control
group would have inhibition problems that would interfere with the task, given that
in the ADHD group only one child failed the Sally Anne task for this reason. The
current study also controlled for language ability and it is possible that the children
included in the Muris et al. (1999) study may have failed the task due to language
comprehension difficulties. Again, this would not be expected in a normal
population. There was also not sufficient information in the Muris et al. (1999) study
to allow control in this study for differences in task administration. Differences such
as interest in presentation may have affected the child's motivation to attend.
The number of children failing the Sally Anne task in the Muris et al. study is
surprisingly high. 70% of their 7-8 year olds failed whereas Baron-Cohen et al.
(1985) found that 85% of children aged 3-5 years in their sample passed the Sally
Anne Task. Therefore the finding that children with ADHD performed significantly
better than the normal children in Muris et al.'s sample, is not likely to be indicative
that more children with ADHD have 1st order theory of mind than the normal
population. The purpose of this study was to investigate the performance for ADHD
children and in this case there is no indication that children with ADHD have
difficulty with 1st order theory ofmind tasks.
Passing 1st order theory of mind tasks does not indicate that children have good
social abilities. Autistic children often pass 1st order theory of mind tasks and are
still reported to have difficulties (Frith et al., 1994). Therefore it cannot be
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concluded that children with ADHD have good theory of mind on the basis of these
findings.
2nd Order tasks
Significantly more children with ADHD failed the Ice-Cream Van Task than children
in Muris et al. (1999) normal sample. This finding is consistent with the chance
finding of Buitlaar et al. (1999) more children with ADHD had failed 2nd order
theory ofmind tasks than children in a normal control group.
If the ADHD children in this sample passed the Sally Anne task (which they all did)
it was assumed that they had the ability to inhibit responding to salient environmental
cues in these tasks. It is possible that the added complexity of the 2nd order task
increased the inhibitory control needed. Alternatively, inhibitory control could have
been more difficult on the Ice-Cream Van Task due to the visibility of the response
requiring suppression. That is, the child had to inhibit the response that Mary was at
the church when they knew and could see that she was there. Whereas in the Sally
Anne Task they could not see the ball and therefore only had to inhibit a response
based on their knowledge, not a visual cue. However the control questions designed
to check the understanding of the story and the memory of the details also required
responses which were incongruent to the visual cues and each child responded
correctly to these. Additionally, it would be expected that those who had more
difficulty inhibiting responses on the Stroop would be more likely to fail the Ice-
Cream Van Task due to inhibition. However, this was not the case as no differences
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were found in Stroop performance between the children who failed and the children
who passed the Ice-Cream Van Task.
Therefore the children with ADHD had more difficulty with a 2nd order theory of
mind task than the children in normal sample and there is not sufficient evidence to
conclude that this is due to difficulties inhibiting response.
2. Children with ADHD are less competent at attributing mental states
than children in a normal sample.
The Strange Stories were used as a measure to test this hypothesis. Children with
ADHD gave significantly fewer correct justifications to the stories and used
significantly less correct mental justifications than children in a normal sample which
offers support for the hypothesis. As discussed later when the methodology is
reviewed, this finding is inconclusive due to difficulties with the statistical analysis.
However the summary data indicates that the range for the ADHD children was
much larger (2-24) than that of the normal sample (11-24) and therefore some
children in the ADHD sample performed more poorly than any of the children in the
normal sample. Although, this finding may have been affected by the scores from
the outliers, which are discussed more in detail later in this section.
The evidence for the finding is strengthened, however, when the ages of the children
are taken into account. Happe's sample ranged from 6 years 7 months to 9 years 8
months with a mean of 8 years 7 months. In comparison the ADHD sample ranged
from 6 years 9 months to 12 years 11 months with a mean of 10 years 4 months.
Therefore, it would be expected that the older ADHD population would have an
advantage, assuming that ability to understand others mind states improves with age.
Therefore although this finding would have to be confirmed using a matched control
group, there is provisional evidence to suggest that the children with ADHD had
more difficulty attributing mind states to the characters in the stories than normal
children.
3. More older children with ADHD pass 1st order and 2nd order theory of
mind tasks than younger children with ADHD.
No evidence was found to suggest that more older children with ADHD passed 1st or
2nd order theory of mind tasks than younger children. Therefore there was no
evidence to support the hypothesis that there is a developmental progression of
ability found on these tasks between the ages of six and twelve years.
4. Older children with ADHD are more competent at attributing mental
states than younger children with ADHD.
Performance on the Strange Stories was not associated with age within the range of
this sample. Therefore there was not a developmental progression, apparent in this
sample, of the children's ability to give correct justifications or correct mental
justifications to stories requiring social understanding.
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5. Failure on theory of mind and social understanding tasks is not
associated with verbal comprehension.
Relationship of Verbal Comprehension to Strange Stories
An positive association was found between the children's verbal ability and
performance on the Strange Stories. However, there are several reasons why the
ADHD children's poor performance on the Strange Stories may not be wholly
attributable to difficulties with verbal comprehension.
Firstly, the BPVS was used primarily as a measure to exclude these children who had
a verbal comprehension age equivalent of below five years, which was taken as the
minimum verbal comprehension age needed for understanding the tasks. It was not
intended to be used to explore the relationship between language ability and
performance on the Strange Stories. This would require more rigorous assessment of
language skills. Therefore although an interaction between performance on the
stories and language ability is indicated this measure does not give sufficient
evidence on which to draw this conclusion.
Secondly, the majority of the children scored within the normal range of performance
on the BPVS. That is, 75% of the children scored within 1 standard deviation from
normal population, only one child scored below 2 standard deviations from the
population mean. If most of ADHD children's estimated verbal comprehension is
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within the normal range then poor performance on Strange Stories would not be
expected as a result ofpoor language skills.
Thirdly, the comprehension question in the Strange Stories allowed exploration of
the children's verbal comprehension of the stories and hence helped to highlight and
give additional assistance to those not understanding the content of the story.
Although the comprehension question was not a good screen for those not
understanding the story as the choice of response is dichotomous ('yes' or 'no') and
therefore children could get the result correct by chance.
Fourthly, other research has found that verbal comprehension difficulties cannot
account for poor performance on the Strange Stories. Happe (1994) studied people
with autism who failed all theory ofmind tasks, passed only 1st order tasks and those
who passed both 1st and 2nd order tasks and found a significant difference between
the groups on both verbal comprehension and performance on the Strange Stories.
She argued that the success of the 2nd order theory of mind group could not be
attributed to verbal comprehension differences as one of her control groups, the
learning disabled control, had lower verbal comprehension scores than the autistic
participants who failed all the theory of mind tasks. Despite this, the learning
disabled control performed better on the Strange Stories than the autistic subjects.
Her control group of learning disabled adults had a mean verbal comprehension
score (as estimated by the BPVS) of 56.9 and a range of 40-89. The children in the
ADHD sample of this study had a mean of 95.9 and a range of 61-137. If verbal
comprehension was a significant factor it would be expected that the learning
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disabled population would perform more poorly than the children with ADHD.
Since their results were very similar to the normal child sample (mean score of 21.4
and range of 17-24) it is likely that the learning disabled sample performed better on
the Strange Stories than the ADHD sample. This argument would have to be
substantiated by further research, however it illustrates that the relationship between
verbal comprehension and performance on the Strange Stories is not as direct as may
first appear and the finding that the two variables are associated in children with
ADHD does not necessarily suggest a causal relationship.
6. Social understanding is associated with the ability to inhibit habitual
responses.
A significant positive correlation was found between performance on the Strange
Stories and performance on the Stroop giving evidence to support this hypothesis. It
may be argued that familiarity with words was a confounding factor on the Stroop.
However, if this were the case then as children get older and have more experience
of words, they would be likely to have more difficulty inhibiting the response of
saying the word rather than the colour and would be expected to have slower times.
Conversely, in this study, increase in age was associated with better performance on
the Stroop. This is consistent with other studies using the Stroop and children with
ADHD (Grodzinsky and Diamond, 1992; Seidman et al., 1997) and suggests that
increased word experience is not associated with poorer performance on the Stroop
in children with ADHD. Therefore if there is a confounding effect with word
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experience and the Stroop, it was not apparent in this sample. Further more, there
was no relationship found between scores in the Stroop and scores on the BPVS,
therefore those with a higher estimated verbal comprehension performed no
differently than those with a lower verbal comprehension. Thus an association was
found between performance on the Strange Stories and the Stroop which cannot be
accounted for by familiarity with words.
Conclusions drawn from this data should be cautionary however, as the association
found was not a particularly strong relationship. As can be seen in Figure 3.8 (p.72),
some of the children scoring poorly on the Stroop, in comparison to the rest of the
sample, obtained scores of 10,11 or 12 on the Strange Stories. Therefore although
this finding indicates that executive functioning may have influenced performance on
the Strange Stories, it is not conclusive.
7. Children with ADHD are reported by their parents to have a similar
pattern of social functioning deficits as children with Asperger's
Syndrome.
Australian Scale for Asperger's Syndrome
All of the questions in this assessment were rated as 'frequent' by at least 7% of the
parents asked. Using Attwood's (1998) criteria, 69% of the children had scores
which indicated further assessment ofAsperger's Syndrome. Thus more than half of
the children in the sample were reported to have a score of two or more on 15 or
more of the items on the questionnaire. Only two children in the sample did not have
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any ratings of two or more on any of the questions. Thus the majority of the children
in the sample were reported by their parents to have some behaviours similar to those
seen in children with Asperger's Syndrome.
A significant correlation was found between the Australian Scale for Asperger's
Syndrome and age. Children who were older had higher scores than children who
were younger. Age was correlated with two sections of the questionnaire, social and
emotional behaviours and interests. This result is unexpected as it would be assumed
that as children grow older they learn more about social behaviours and the emotions
of themselves and others. It may be reflective of the expectations ofparents. That is,
as children get older parents may be less forgiving of social and emotional
immaturities or unusual behaviours.
Another unexpected finding was that the performance of children on the Strange
Stories was not associated with the ratings given by parents on the Australian Scale
for Asperger's Syndrome. It may be that the measure was not valid enough to reflect
true behaviour, this is discussed further when reviewing the methodology. Many of
the children in the study were likely to be in the early stages of puberty when social
behaviour towards parents can be very varied and this could have affected the
ratings. Ratings are also likely to have varied across parents, some may be more
accepting than others of different social behaviours and some parents may have more
strict ideas about what their child should be able to do. Variables such as intervention
from professionals, biochemical treatment were also not controlled for. Therefore
there are several factors which could have influenced this questionnaire and which
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were not controlled for in this study and this could explain the lack of association
between the Strange Stories and the Australian Scale for Asperger's Syndrome.
4.3 Discussion of outlying cases
These three cases were highlighted due to their particularly poor score on the Strange
Stories. All three of the cases failed the 2nd order theory ofmind task and two, of the
three, also failed the 1st order theory of mind task, Sally Anne. This is consistent
with the findings of Happe (1994) that poor performance on 1st and 2nd order theory
ofmind tasks is associated with poor performance on the Strange Stories.
Two of the cases (Case 2 and Case 3) have similar profiles on the rest of the tasks.
Case 1 has a markedly different presentation.
Strange Stories
Case 1 gave more mental state justifications than Case 2 and Case 3. This child was
also the only one of the three to pass the Sally Anne Task. Interestingly, Happe
(1994) found that the use of mental state justifications by autistic subjects did not
differ from adult and child controls although their use of correct mental justifications
did. Thus they had an understanding that mental state terms were required but were
unable to select the appropriate term. In the same way, perhaps the use of mental
state terms in this case example suggests she knew that the situations required these
kind of justifications but was not skilled in selecting the appropriate term. The other
two cases highlighted also made some wrong mental state justifications suggesting
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they were aware of mental state involvement in the stories but did not use
appropriate terms.
None of the participants in Happe's sample, including the autistic participants,
performed as poorly as Case 1 or Case 2 since the minimum correct justifications
given by her poorest scoring group (autistic participants that failed both 1st and 2nd
order theory of mind tasks) was six out of 24, the equivalent of three correct
justifications out of twelve.
VerbalAbility
Both Case 2 and Case 3 had estimated verbal ability that was below that of the
normal population. It is possible that poor understanding influenced the scores of
these children especially since both children consistently answered no to the
comprehension question and needed prompting to try and clarify understanding. The
role of verbal ability is considered in more detail earlier in this chapter (p. 90).
In contrast to case two and case three, case one had an estimated verbal ability that
was within one standard deviation from the normal population. Therefore, her
performance is more likely explained by difficulties attending to the story or




Most striking in Case 1 was her poor score on the Stroop. This was due to her
inability to retain the purpose of the task resulting in her reading the words instead of
saying the colours after item 10. This can be explained by an inability to suppress
what the environmental cues were indicating i.e. to say the words she saw despite the
instructions to say the colour of the word. In contrast, Case 3 had a Stroop score that
did not deviate from the norm of the sample and attended well to the tasks.
Case 3 did not have a diagnosis of autism however his responses were repetitive and
his interpretations often literal. Therefore it is possible he had unidentified autism.
The issue of unidentified co-morbidity as an explanation for the results is discussed
later in this section.
Conclusions about a population cannot be drawn from one or two individuals
however the extremely poor performance on a measure of verbal ability in Case 2
and Case 3, the autistic like presentation of Case 3 and the very poor inhibitory
control of Case 1 illustrates three factors which may influence performance on theory
ofmind tasks and the Strange Stories. That is, very poor verbal comprehension, poor




The findings of this study will now be discussed with relation to the theories and
studies reviewed in the introduction.
4.4.1 Theory of mind and ADHD
The finding that more children with ADHD fail 2nd order theory of mind tasks than a
normal sample confirmed the findings of Buitelaar et al. (1999). This finding is also
extended as results suggest that children with ADHD performed more poorly than a
normal sample when asked to attribute mind states to story characters. Children with
ADHD were also rated highly on many questions describing social difficulty by their
parents.
There are several explanations which may account for these findings. Executive
dysfunction (EDF) in children with ADHD may influence social ability. Or social
learning experiences may be affected by ADHD and these children may have a
reduced opportunity to learn about mind states. Alternatively the neurological areas
which are affected by ADHD may be associated with theory of mind deficits. It
may be that children with ADHD share this trait with children with autism and
Asperger's Syndrome due to similarities between the disorders or co-morbidity.
These hypotheses are examined below.
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Executive Functioning Deficits
As discussed in the introduction, people with autism or Asperger's Syndrome who
have executive functioning deficits may not show deficits on theory of mind tasks
(Osonoff et al., 1991b) and children with autism aged from three to five years have
been found to have no executive functioning deficits despite behavioural symptoms
of autism. Mitchell (1997) suggests that theory of mind and EDF are two separate
cognitive deficiencies present in autism and Osonoff et al. (1991b) proposed that
similar neurological processes are involved with both abilities i.e. the ability to
internally represent information and act on it effectively. Therefore, evidence
suggests that EDF is not the cause of theory ofmind deficits in people with autism or
Asperger's Syndrome but that there is a relationship.
Children with ADHD have executive functioning deficits that are similar to those
found in children with autism (Grodzinsky and Diamond, 1992). It may be that even
though EDF and theory of mind do not seem to be causally linked in children with
autism, EDF may influence social understanding in ADHD. Alternatively, as is
hypothesised for autism, EDF may co-occur with theory of mind difficulties for
neurological reasons. These two suggestions are now examined.
Some of the responses given by the ADHD children to the Strange Stories could be
explained in terms of Barkley's (1997) theory of self-regulation as a central deficit in
ADHD children. Thus self-regulation problems mean that these children have
difficulty planning, considering rules, utilising past experience and making
predictions about the future on which to base their responses. They tend to respond
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to immediate environmental cues and immediately available consequences (Barkley,
1997). It may be that when considering the responses of the characters in the stories,
the ADHD children based their judgements on short-term consequences and failed to
consider the details of the story. For example, in the story that children most
frequently failed to justify correctly, the double bluff story, the responses of the
ADHD children indicated that they tended to focus on the imminent consequence for
the soldier (i.e. possible torture or death) and therefore they gave responses such as
'he didn't want to die' or 'he thought he was saving his army but he probably forgot
they were in the mountains'. They did not consider that the soldier may have
alternative motives for telling the truth i.e. he thinks that they think that he will lie to
them. The story involving contrary emotion, to which 27% of the ADHD children
gave an incorrect justification, is more difficult to explain in terms of self-regulation.
These incorrect responses were primarily due to a failure to recognise that the child
in the story was feeling two emotions at the same time for different reasons. Several
of these children gave a justification for the character experiencing one emotion for
two reasons e.g. 'because she wants to make her friend happy and maybe she'll get a
prize', 'She's sad because her friend won and sad because she didn't win' or changed
the facts of the story to fit in with their interpretation e.g. 'because it was her best
friend that won but she didn't want her to win'. Possibly the children were focusing
on one aspect of the story, that Sarah lost the competition, and found it difficult to
consider other factors in the story that would make Sarah feel differently. In both
these stories, children seemed to have difficulty dealing with conflicting social
information and instead of considering several reasons for the characters utterances,
they adjusted the story to fit their interpretation.
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The responses on the Strange Stories indicate that the children with ADHD had
difficulty dealing with apparently conflicting information. This is consistent with an
executive dysfunction explanation as difficulties organising and dealing flexibly with
information would influence ability to deal with information in these stories. This
suggestion is consistent with the findings of Shapiro et al. (1993), described in the
introduction (section 1.2.2), that children with ADHD had difficulties processing
conflicting information about emotion and content of speech or facial expression.
Thus the poor performance of the children with ADHD on the Strange Stories could
be accounted for by poor strategies in the organising and utilisation of the
information in the stories. Therefore, children with ADHD may have the ability to
understand others minds but have difficulties using this information effectively when
making and acting on social judgements.
This lack of cognitive flexibility in dealing with information would be consistent
with the finding that poor performance on the Stroop is related to poor performance
of the Strange Stories. It may be that the children who had more difficulties
inhibiting response were inclined to be impulsive with their answers. That is, they
had difficulty inhibiting the first response to occur to them and therefore failed to
consider several aspects of the stories.
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If the executive functioning difficulties of children with ADHD affect their response
to social situations then it may be that their learning experience about social
interaction has been affected in the long term by these deficits.
Social Learning
Camarata and Gibson (1999) suggested that pragmatic difficulties in children with
ADHD can be explained by the features of ADHD (failure to attend to instructions,
difficulty sustaining attention in play, susceptibility to distraction and a tendency to
not listen) interfering with mother child interaction. Peterson and Seigal (1995)
propose that social communication deficits are likely to instigate poorer social
interaction and reduce conversations relating to thoughts and intentions between
adults and children.
Theory of mind difficulties have been found in populations with disabilities which
affect social interaction, e.g. deaf children (Peterson & Siegal, 1995; Russell et al.,
1998), blind children (Minter et al., 1998). It has been hypothesised that exposure to
conversations about mind states is a facilitating factor in the development of theory
of mind. Further support for this has been found in studies of children without
disabilities. Youngblade and Dunn (1995) found that social play with mothers and
siblings at 33 months was related to social understanding at 40 months and Dunn et
al. (1991) found that mothers' conversations about feelings at 33 months related to
understanding of emotion and false belief at 40 months.
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Therefore the reduced quality of interaction that children with ADHD have as a
result of the behavioural presentation of ADHD may hinder their development of
theory of mind. If this were the case however, it would be expected that children
with ADHD would have a delayed theory ofmind and their understanding of mind
states would develop as they accumulated more experience of conversations and
social situations concerning mind states. Thus it would be expected that
development of theory ofmind would have been evident in this study, however older
children performed no better on the tasks than younger children. It may be that
children with ADHD have enduring social difficulties and fail to fully develop theory
ofmind, possibly due to their continuing EF deficits. It may also be that the delay in
theory of mind extends beyond the age group of the sample. Russell et al. (1998)
found evidence for a delayed development of theory ofmind in deaf children finding
that children aged 13-16 years performed significantly better than those aged 4-12
years. Therefore if older children had been included in the ADHD sample more of a
developmental pattern might have emerged.
If the symptoms ofADHD affected social experience and learning about others mind
states, it would be expected that all children with ADHD would be affected.
However, not all the children in the sample had difficulties with the theory of mind
tasks. 75% of the ADHD children passed the Ice-Cream Van Task, 20% of these
children made 12 correct justifications on the Strange Stories. It could be argued
that, as with Asperger's Syndrome, some children can perform well on the tasks but
when faced with real social situations often have difficulty (Frith et al., 1994).
Therefore the ADHD children who illustrated good performance on the tasks may
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not have good skills in everyday social situations. The parent rated questionnaire
used in this study gives some evidence for this as 60% of the ADHD children were
rated as appearing unaware of social conventions and making inappropriate actions
and comments and 50% as appearing uninterested in another's side of conversations.
Since the questionnaire did not relate to performance on theory of mind tasks, it is
possible that some of the children who performed well on the tasks were rated as
having social difficulties by their parents.
Neurological Functioning
An alternative explanation for the findings is that the neurological areas responsible
for social functioning are affected in ADHD. This is a difficult hypothesis to explore
as many areas of the brain have been associated with theory of mind and many areas
have been associated with ADHD. It is also possible that several areas of the brain
are involved in theory ofmind and in ADHD as problems with neural pathways have
been implicated in both (Happe et al. 1999; Spreen et al.,1995).
As discussed in the introduction, people with right hemisphere damage have been
found to have theory of mind problems (Happe et al. 1999) and right hemisphere
structural differences have been found in children with ADHD (Hynd, Semrud-
Clikeman, Lorys, Novey, Eliopulos & Lyytinen, 1991). Happe et al.'s (1999) study
involved people who had suffered damage to a previously intact cognitive system.
Therefore the ability to attribute mind states was already developed in these
individuals. Different areas may be implicated in the process of developing theory of
mind and these areas may be affected by ADHD.
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It has been suggested that children with ADHD have immaturities in their frontal
lobes (Spreen et al., 1995) or lack of blood flow to the frontal lobes (Lou, Henriksen
& Bruhn, 1984). Grodzinsky and Diamond (1992) found that children with ADHD
performed more poorly than controls on several tasks associated with frontal lobe
functioning. Ozonoff et al. (1991b) suggests that both executive functioning and
theory of mind may be functions associated with the pre-frontal cortex which has
been implicated in the storing of information about behavioural response. They
suggest that both theory of mind and executive functioning involve the ability to
internally represent, organise and act on information. Therefore the two abilities are
linked by the neurological areas they depend on however are independent of each
other. If this is true for both autism and ADHD, this highlights another possible
hypothesis. That ADHD and autism share EDF and theory of mind difficulties
because the disorders are closely linked, perhaps even the same disorder but with
different severities of behavioural presentation. Alternatively, it may be that
neurological similarities cause high co-morbidity and many children with ADHD
have autism or Aspreger's Syndrome which has not been identified. These
hypotheses are examined below
ADHD andAutism/Asperger's Syndrome
Children with ADHD in this study were rated by their parents as having many of the
behaviours associated with Asperger's Syndrome. This finding was consistent with
the findings of Clark et al. (1999) that children with ADHD scored highly on a
questionnaire of autistic behaviours. Some of the behaviours in the Australian Scale
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for Asperger's Syndrome which were rated as common in children with ADHD can
be explained in terms of behavioural features of ADHD.
The behaviour rated as frequent by the highest percentage of parents was a lack of
subtlety in expression of emotion (69%). Barkley (1997) suggests that emotions,
once elicited, are moderated by the self-regulatory function of executive processes.
He points to research linking the development of inhibition and self-regulation to
emotional responses in pre-school children as evidence for this association (Barkley,
1997). This assumption would also explain the report of 52% of ADHD children in
this study lacking precision in their expression of emotion.
However, some of the other highly rated questions in this study are more difficult to
explain in terms of self-regulation. The second highest rated characteristic, 'needs an
excessive amount of reassurance, especially if things are changed or go wrong', is
not easily explained by the deficits described by Barkley (1997). One possible
explanation is that if children with ADHD find it more difficult to consider future
consequences and integrate plans and rules, then changes instigated by other people
may be difficult to understand, provoke anxiety and require reassurance. This
question is also very ambiguous, as discussed further in the methodological
considerations (p. 115) and ifmore emphasis was put on the description 'if things go
wrong' by the rater, the tendency of children with ADHD to get into trouble may
explain the need for excessive reassurance if things go wrong which are not their
fault and they are concerned they will get the blame.
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In the current study, 50% of parents rated their children as using less eye contact than
would be expected. Poor eye contact was listed by Clark et al. (1999) as included in
their category of 'problems in non-verbal communication' reported by 71.4% of the
parent's of their ADHD sample. However 'less eye contact than would be expected'
can be explained in terms of children with ADHD being more likely to be distracted
in conversation and having difficulties sustaining visual attention in interactions.
Thus, the reports of behaviours associated with Asperger's Syndrome in children
with ADHD can be explained by features ofADHD.
However, although an association was found between inhibition and performance on
social understanding tasks, performance on the Stroop was not associated with the
parent rated questionnaire. However, as commented before, only one measure of
executive functioning was used and therefore an association between everyday social
functioning and executive functioning may be found in these children if more
extensive measurement was used. It would be interesting to examine the severity of
ADHD symptoms compared with the difficulties reported in the questionnaires.
Unfortunately, Clark et al. (1999) did not provide this information in their data and a
measure of symptoms ofADHD was not included in this study.
Although children with ADHD share many of the same behavioural symptoms with
Asperger's Syndrome it is likely to be for different reasons. That is children with
Asperger's Syndrome may have a lack of interest in interaction as well as a lack of
ability whereas children with ADHD may be interested but are lacking in the skills.
It could also be that Asperger's Syndrome children have a more fundamental deficit
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in social ability whereas children with ADHD have difficulty as a result of EF
deficits. Alternatively, the report of several Asperger's behaviours in children with
ADHD may also be explained by co-morbidity.
Co-morbidity
Another explanation for these findings is that of co-morbidity in the sample.
Although children who had a dual diagnosis of autism or Asperger's Syndrome were
eliminated from the study, it is possible that there were some children in the sample
whose primary diagnosis of ADHD masked symptoms which would usually lead a
clinician to considering autism. Clark et al. (1999) explain their finding, that
children with ADHD have many autistic symptoms, by suggesting that the long
standing behavioural problems of these children and hyperactivity mean that
additional diagnoses are not routinely considered. That is, if a child is identified as
having ADHD, then behaviours indicative of autism or Asperger's Syndrome, might
be explained by the symptoms of ADHD or longstanding behavioural problems and
make further investigation less likely. Case 3, described in the results and above (p.
97) may be such a case. His rigid presentation of answers and frequent literal
interpretation was suggestive of autism or Asperger's Syndrome. It is likely that,
since screening for the study could not be completely rigorous, some children were
included who may have had a co-morbid diagnosis of autism or Asperger's, if further
assessment was conducted. This is a criticism of the study but also raises the point
that many of these children may have an unidentified co-morbid diagnosis which is
exacerbating their difficulties. The pattern of results of the study however do not
appear to differentiate the children into two groups as would be expected if there was
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a group of children with autism and Asperger's in addition to ADHD who accounted
for the poor scores on the theory ofmind tasks.
A possible explanation for this, is a group of children who have been identified by
several researchers (e.g. Gillberg, Rasmussen, Carlstrom, Svenson & Waldenstrom,
1982) as having disorders of attention, motor control and perception. This group of
children have been termed 'DAMP', although this is not an official diagnostic
criteria in ICD-10 or DSM-IV. Gillberg (1992) reviewed his previous studies on
children with DAMP and concluded that the children with severe DAMP often show
social impairments, semantic pragmatic problems and repetitive obsessive
behaviours, although to a lesser extent than is observed in autism. He also
highlighted that about one third of the population studied had hyperkinetic syndrome,
some ofwhich showed autistic features, some did not. He suggested that there were
no clear boundaries between the disorders. Therefore perhaps amongst the sample
for this study, there were children who would have satisfied the criteria for DAMP
and had additional social impairments but to a lesser extent than would be expected
in autism and therefore did not differentiate substantially from the others.
Although it is possible that co-morbidity influenced the results, it seems more
plausible that some of the children in the sample may have met the criteria for
DAMP. In their ratings on the Australian Scale for Asperger's Syndrome, 26% of
parents gave a rating of 'frequently' to the question 'does the child have poor motor
co-ordination?' although the relationship of those scoring highly on this question to
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their scores on the theory ofmind tasks was not studied since one question rated by
parents is not indicative of diagnostic motor problems.
In conclusion there are arguments to suggest that executive functioning deficits,
social learning experience, neurological differences and co-morbidity may be
implicated in the theory ofmind ability of children with ADHD. These explanations
are not mutually exclusive. It is especially likely that a neurological explanation is
linked with executive functioning deficits. The ability to learn about social
experience is also likely to be affected by neurological and executive functioning
deficits or co-morbidity. Therefore each of the above hypothesised influences may
affect theory of mind ability and there may also be an interaction between two or
more factors.
4.4.2 Executive Functioning and Theory ofMind Tasks
The findings of this study also contribute to the discussion of the effect of executive
functioning on theory of mind tasks outlined in the introduction. It would be
expected that children with ADHD would be particularly susceptible to failure on
these tasks due to executive functioning. The finding that 43 out of the 45 ADHD
children assessed, passed the Sally Anne Task suggests that executive functioning
difficulties are not likely to influence this task extensively and therefore contradicts




Social deficits are fundamental in children with autism and therefore are a focus for
assessment and intervention. However this is rarely the emphasis for children with
ADHD as focus tends to be on issues such as reducing disruptive behaviour or
increasing attention and concentration on school-work. If these children lack the
social ability or understanding to participate in appropriate social interaction they
will need assistance to learn about and experience positive appropriate interaction.
If children with ADHD have difficulties taking account of others' thoughts and
feelings in social interaction, and if the reason for this difficulty is not because they
do not possess the ability to appreciate others' minds but that they do not use this
information effectively, then this has implications for the intervention. Children with
autism and Asperger's Syndrome may have a deficit in the ability to understand
others' minds whereas children with ADHD may lack the skills to organise and apply
social information. Therefore intervention aimed at teaching children to stop and
consider the other person's thoughts and intentions before responding may be
beneficial. Additionally if the features of ADHD have disadvantaged the social
learning process of these children, they may also need explicit teaching about and
increased experience of others' minds.
The findings also raise the possibility of unidentified co-morbidity with autism or
Asperger's Syndrome in this group. This indicates that the consideration of dual
diagnosis when assessing and treating these children is important. The presence of
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co-morbidity would also impact on intervention as deficits in these children may be
more difficult to overcome if the mechanisms for social understanding are




Some of the issues debated in theory of mind tasks were examined in the
introduction. Critics have suggested that executive functioning rather than theory of
mind is being measured by these tasks (Russell et ah, 1991). Although the false
photo tasks was included to control for the possibility of failure on the Sally Anne
task for this reason, no control task was used for the Ice-Cream Van Task which may
have been more susceptible to difficulties inhibiting salient environmental cues due
to the visibility of the position of the ice-cream van. However no significant
differences on performance of the Stroop were found between those failing and those
passing the tasks which suggests that those who failed the tasks did not show any
more difficulties inhibiting response than those who passed.
As suggested by Mayes, Klin, Tercyak, Cinchetti & Cohen (1996), basing decisions
about whether a child does or does not have theory ofmind on one question does not
seem a valid way to draw conclusions. Many autistic children who pass theory of
mind tasks still show difficulties with social interaction (Happe et ah, 1999),
therefore the tasks are not sensitive enough on which to base judgements about social
-112-
functioning. However, the use of the Strange Stories, found to be a more sensitive
measure of children's understanding of mind states (Happe, 1994), gives a more
valid indication of theory of mind ability in this study. In support of the validity of
the measures, the finding that those children who failed the Ice-Cream Van Task
made significantly less correct mental justifications to the stories suggests the
assessments may be measuring common factors.
Strange Stories.
The stories used a comprehension question as an indication of the understanding of
the child. However only a 'yes' or 'no' response is required. Therefore there is a
50% chance that the child could give the correct answer to this question even if they
didn't understand the content of the story. Thus the comprehension question was not
an accurate indication ofwhether or not the child understood the story.
Only 12 of the 24 stories were used and therefore the scores were doubled to allow
comparison with the data from Happe (1994). Doubling the scores of the children
assumes that they would have performed equally on a story about the same mind
state. This could have falsely raised the score of children with ADHD by giving
them credit for a response they may not have given or may falsely reduce their score
by assuming if they got one of the stories incorrect they would get another
illustrating a similar scenario also incorrect. However use of all 24 stories would
have been more time consuming and also required more concentration and
maintenance of on-task behaviour which may have led to less compliance and more
varied results from the ADHD children.
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The judgement of a correct/ incorrect justification and a justification involving
mental states is somewhat subjective as it is decided by the experimenter using the
criteria suggested by Happe (1994) as a guide. An attempt was made to reduce these
biases by using two raters, between which good compliance was found (see Table
2.1, p.58).
Prompting
The scoring criteria of Happe (1994) was used which stipulated that the score on the
stories was taken from the response given before prompting. Prompts were used
with the ADHD sample however scores were taken before prompting. Twelve of the
ADHD children gave a better response on one or more of the stories following
prompting. Thus when these children were given external regulation, that is
prompted to consider the story longer, they reached a better social understanding of
the story. It could also be argued however that the use of prompting with children
with ADHD primed the children into thinking more carefully and considering the
character's mind states in subsequent stories. If this were true this would give the
children with ADHD an advantage over the children in Happe's sample, and despite
this they still performed more poorly. However, the protocol for prompting was not
agreed before testing and therefore it was not done in a consistent manner. Where
children's scores did improve following prompting, this was often only in one
question and therefore may not have improved the children's scores sufficiently to
make a difference to the overall performance. Therefore, conclusions cannot be
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drawn about whether prompting improved the ADHD children's overall scores or
not.
Measures of Verbal Comprehension.
The BPVS is only a screening measure and therefore cannot be used to draw definite
conclusions about the children's verbal ability. There was also no measure of other
verbal abilities such as language expression. Children with ADHD have problems in
this area in several areas of language (Westby & Cutler, 1994) and this may have
affected their ability to express their knowledge ofmind states.
Australian Scale for Asperger's Syndrome.
Many of questions in this assessment are open to interpretation. For example, the
question 'needs an excessive amount of reassurance, especially if things are changed
or go wrong' refers to two distinct types of situation. If 'things are changed' this is
likely to be an externally controlled source, such as parent or teacher and could be a
minor incident such as moving an ornament or a piece of furniture or a major
incident such as moving house. The second situation 'if things go wrong' could refer
to major or minor incidents or incidents that are internally controlled by the child e.g.
getting into trouble, accidentally breaking a toy or which are externally controlled
e.g. the house is flooded. The response of the child is likely to vary given the
amount of control and responsibility they feel for the situation and therefore the
rating given to this question is very much dependant on the parents interpretation of
what it is asking about. Also, many of the questions included terms such as
'excessive' or 'less than expected' which rely on the judgement of the parent as to
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what levels of behaviour are defined by these terms. Again, ratings may be affected
by differences in individual's interpretation. Additionally, some parents may be
more inclined to rate their children higher due to difficulties with them at the time
e.g. frustrations with behaviour at home, trouble with school or lower if they do not
want to convey the extent of their child's difficulties.
Parents were either sent the questionnaire or completed it while the child was being
assessed. They were not guided through the assessment by a clinician and did not
have an opportunity to ask questions during completion of the questionnaire.
Therefore, misunderstanding may have affected the accuracy of report in the
questionnaire.
Therefore there are several factors which may have influenced the scores on this
questionnaire other than the presence of the behaviours in the children and so,
conclusions drawn from this questionnaire should be treated with caution.
Measures ofExecutive Functioning.
The Stroop was chosen as a measure of inhibition guided by the literature using this
assessment with children with ADHD (Grodinsky & Diamond, 1992; Everett,
Thomas, Cote, Levesque & Michaud, 1991) and the emphasis on inhibition given by
the most recent theories of ADHD (Barkley, 1997). The Stroop has been used in the
assessment of several neuropsychological functions, most prominently response
inhibition or selective attention (Lezak, 1995). Therefore although it is widely
regarded as a measure of inhibition, it may also be affected by deficits in other
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neuropsychological functions. This has to be considered when interpreting the
results.
Additionally there was not the time nor the resources to be selective about the
version of the Stroop which was used, and the only one available within the time
constraints, does not have norms for children. However the primary use of this
assessment was to make within subjects comparisons with attainment on other tasks
and therefore, although findings should be treated with caution, it was seen as
applicable to the purpose.
The Stroop was the only executive functioning task used. The cause of problems
with theory of mind is still much debated and although evidence has shown that
theory ofmind and executive functioning are unrelated in children with autism, this
may not be the case in ADHD. It would have been useful to have additional
measures of executive functioning, such as the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test and the
Tower of Hanoi to allow more conclusions to be draw about the influence of these
abilities on theory ofmind and children with ADHD. However, the main purpose of
this study was to investigate the performance of children with ADHD on theory of
mind tasks. Relating this to executive functioning remains to be investigated in
future studies.
4.6.2 Control group
One of the major short comings of this study was the lack of control group. A
control group was not used due to the time constraints involved in the study and the
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availability ofmatched controls. Also, several studies give data on the performance
of theory of mind tasks in normal children and data was available to compare
performance with a normal sample on the Strange Stories.
However on reflection a control group would have allowed more meaningful
comparisons of data to be made, would have reduced the influence ofmethodological
differences between this study and those used to compare data and would also have
allowed more qualitative comparison between the types of responses given by
children with ADHD and those given by children without ADHD.
4.6.2 Data Analysis of the Strange Stories
Efforts were made to obtain the raw data of the normal sample group used for
comparison on the Strange Stories by contacting the author. However, this data was
not made available and therefore comparison had to be made with the summary data
of Happe's (1994) normal sample stated in the published paper. Information on the
shape of the data was not obtainable and therefore the assumptions for using a t-test
could not be fully tested. However, the use of parametric statistics for this analysis
was the only option given the data available. Therefore, the findings of this analysis
must be treated with caution.
4.6.4 Stimulant Medication
A criticism of this study is that there was no control over the levels of stimulant
medication that were being taken by the children. All children in the study were
taking methylphenidate and it was requested that they take it at their usual time.
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Since children were seen at different times of day, there was no control over the time
elapsed since their last methylphenidate tablet. However, all the children who were
included attended sufficiently well to the tasks for the assessments to be completed.
This has implications for the use of the Stroop in assessment of these children which
may be affected by medication. Although, Everett et al. (1991) found that ADHD
children who were given stimulant medication for a year improved scores on the
Wisconsin Card Sorting Test but not on the Stroop and concluded that this test was
more resistant to the effects of stimulant medication. However this does not inform
about the effect of medication on performance on the other tasks, in particular, the
Strange Stories which may have varied ifmedication affected the children's ability to
attend to aspects of the stories.
No measures were taken of the age at which children started taking methylphenidate
or the length of time that they were on medication. Therefore, a more long term
effect on social ability of stimulant medication was not considered. If, as is
suggested by several theorists social learning is affected by ADHD (Peterson &
Seigal, 1995; Camarata & Gibson, 1999), then the age that a child began taking
methylphenidate and the amount of time the child has been taking methylphenidate
may affect their social ability. Further investigation would be needed to explore this
suggestion however, it is possible that the children performing well in this study may
have an advantage for this reason.
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4.7 Further research
Before drawing conclusions about theory of mind in children with ADHD, the
findings in this study would have to be substantiated by linking the children's
performance on these tasks to social ability in real life situations. Although the
questionnaire attempted to do this to a certain extent, the lack of association between
formal assessment and parental report questions the validity of the measures. The
influence of executive functioning and theory of mind in this population merits
further investigation. Assessment using several measures of executive functioning
alongside the theory ofmind, social understanding and assessment of everyday social
interaction would be needed to inform on the role of executive functioning in the
social difficulties of this group. Thus in order to draw sound conclusions about the
nature of theory ofmind in children with ADHD and the possible links to EDF, there
would have to be closer examination of these children's social ability in everyday life
and more rigorous assessment of their executive functioning.
This study would also need to be replicated using more controlled comparison group
to confirm the results. Comparing children with ADHD on these measures to normal
controls, children with learning disabilities and children with autism or Asperger's




There is some evidence to suggest that children with ADHD have more difficulty
with 2nd order theory of mind tasks and understanding mind states than normal
children. There is also evidence to suggest that children with ADHD have many of
the social behaviours associated with Asperger's Syndrome. The children's
performance on the tasks and the behaviours highlighted can be explained in terms of
an executive dysfunction hypothesis. Social learning may also be a factor
influencing the development of theory of mind in children with ADHD although the
findings of this study do not extend to evidence for or against this hypothesis.
Further understanding of neurological areas affected by ADHD and involved in
theory of mind ability is needed before conclusions can be draw about neurological
links between theory of mind and ADHD. It is also possible that there is a higher
level of co-morbidity between ADHD and autistic spectrum disorders than is
currently recognised which could account for theory of mind difficulties in some of
the children in the study.
There are many methodological difficulties with this study. These include lack of a
control group, lack of controls over levels and duration of prescription of stimulant
medication and lack of comprehensive language assessment. Further investigation
with controls for these variables would be needed to substantiate the findings of this
study on theory ofmind and ADHD.
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APPENDIX 1:
DSM-IV Criteria for Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder
DSM-IV Diagnositic Criteria for Attention-Deficit/ Hyperactivity Disorder.
A. Either (1) or (2)
(1) Six (or more) of the following symptoms of inattention have persisted for at least
6
months to a degree that is maladaptive and inconsistent with developmental level.
Inattention
a) Often fails to give close attention to details or makes careless mistakes in
schoolwork, work or other activites.
b) Often has difficulty sustaining attention in tasks or play activities.
c) Often does not seem to listen when spoken to directly.
d) Often does not follow through on instructions and fails to finish schoolwork,
chores, or duties in the workplace (not due to oppositional behaviour or
failure to understand instructions).
e) Often has difficulty organising tasks and activities.
f) Often avoids, dislikes or is reluctant to engage in tasks that require sustained
mental effort (such as schoolwork or homework).
g) Often loses things necessary for tasks or activities (e.g. toys, school
assignments, pencils, books or tools).
h) Is often easily distracted by extraneous stimuli.
i) Is often forgetful in daily activities.
(2) Six (or more) of the following symptoms ofhyperactivity-impulsivity have
persisted for at least 6 months to a degree that is maladaptive and inconsistent
with developmental level.
Hyperactivity
a) Often fidgets with hands or feet or squirms in seat.
b) Leaves seat in classroom or in other situations in which remaining seated is
expected.
c) Often runs about or climbs excessively in situations which it is inappropriate
(in adolescents or adults, may be limited to restlessness).
d) Often has difficulty playing or engaging in leisure activities quietly.
e) Is often 'on the go' or often acts as if driven by a motor.
f) Often talks excessively.
Impulsivity
g) Often blurts out answers before questions have been completed.
h) Often has difficulty awaiting turn.
i) Often interrupts or intrudes on others (e.g. butts into conversations or games).
B. Some hyperactive-impulsive or inattentive symptoms that cause impairment were
present before age 7.
C. Some impairment from the symptoms is present in two or more settings (e.g. at
School [or work] and at home).
D. There must be clear evidence ofclinically significant impairment in social,
Academic or occupational functioning.
E. The symptoms do not occur exclusively during the course of a Pervasive
Developmental Disorder, Schizophrenia or other Psychotic Disorder and are not
better accounted for by another mental disorder (e.g. Mood Disorder, Anxiety
Disorder, Dissociative Disorder or Personality Disorder).
APPENDIX 2:
Letter of invitation to participate in the study
Grampian University Hospitals
ROYAL ABERDEEN CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL
CORNHILL ROAD, ABERDEEN AB25 2ZG
TEL: 01224 681818 EXT: 52706
FAX: 01224 840938
DEPARTMENT OF CHILD AND FAMILY PSYCHIATRY
Mr and Mrs Smith
Aberdeen
date
Dear Mr and Mrs Smith
The child psychology department are doing a research project looking at the
social skills of children with ADHD,
I wondered if you would like John to participate in the project.
I have enclosed some information to help you decide whether or not you
would like John to take part.
If you decide to participate, please sign the enclosed consent form and you
will then be contacted by Maggie Whyte from the psychology department who
will arrange to see John.
If you do not wish your child to participate your treatment will not be affected
in any way.




Letter of information about the study.
Grampian University Hospitals
Department ofClinical Psychology
Royal Aberdeen Children's Hospital
Cornhill Road
Aberdeen AB25 2ZG
Development of Theory of Mind in children with ADHD
Information for Parents/ Guardians
Dear Parent/ Guardian,
The department ofChild Clinical Psychology is doing a study about children with ADHD and
their understanding of how other people think and behave.
We are writing to invite your child to take part.
Aim. The aim of the project is to find out whether children with ADHD have difficulties in this
area.
What does the project involve? Children taking part in the study will be asked to talk about
the thoughts and behaviour of characters in various stories. They will also be asked to name
objects in some pictures to look at their vocabulary skills. Parents/ guardians will be sent a
questionnaire to fill in about their child's social behaviour.
How long will it take? To complete all the tasks takes about 45 minutes.
Where wouldmy child be seen? You will choose whether your child is seen in school, at home
or at the child psychology department.
Will 1 find out how it went? You will be sent information about the results of the project.
Further queries can be discussed with your psychiatrist/ psychologist.
Confidentiality. All the information collected in the study is confidential. Copies of the tasks
completed in the study will be kept in your child's psychology/ psychiatry file unless you have
an objection to this.
If you have no objections to your child's participation in this project, please sign the
attached consent form and return it in the SAE provided.
If you do agree to participate you can change your mind at any time and withdraw your child
from the study. You are under no obligation to take part.
Thank you for considering taking part in this study. If you have any questions or wish to
discuss any aspects of the study, please do not hesitate to contact us.
yours faithfully
Maggie Whyte
Psychologist in Clinical Training
Department ofChild Psychology
Royal Aberdeen Children's Hospital




ext. 54110 ext. 53268





CONSENT BY PARENT/ GUARDIAN FOR THEIR CHILD TO PARTICIPATE
IN:
A Study of Theory ofMind in Children with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder
(ADHD)
Name ofChild: John Smith
Name ofParent/ Guardian: Mr and Mrs Smith
Name ofStudy: The development of theory of mind and children with
ADHD.
Principal Investigator: Maggie Whyte, Psychologist in Clinical Training
I have read the patient/volunteer information sheet on the above study and have had
the
opportunity to contact, Maggie Whyte, Psychologist to discuss the details.
I have agreed to my child taking part in the study as it is has been outlined to me, but I
understand that I am completely free to withdraw my child from the study or any part
of the study at any time I wish and that this will not affect my child's continuing
treatment in any way.
I understand that these trials are part of a research project designed to promote
medical knowledge, which has been approved by the Grampian Research Ethics
Committee, and may be of no benefit to me personally. The Grampian Research
Ethics Committee may wish to inspect the data collected at any time as part of its
monitoring activities.
I hereby frilly and freely consent for my child to participate in the study which is











(Royal Aberdeen Children's Hospital)
I confirm that I have provided the above parent/ guardian with information about the
nature and purpose of the study to be undertaken and have given them the opportunity
to discuss this further with myselfor my supervisor.
Signature of Investigator:
Date:
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Australian Scale for Asperger's Syndrome
Please complete the following by circling the appropriate number on the scale
beside each of the questions. Also, please note, a score of zero would be the
usual level expected of a child of that age.
A SOCIAL Aj\'D E/40T10NAL ABILITIES
1. Does the child lack an understanding; of how toCD
play with other children? For example, unaware
of the unwritten rules of social play.
2. When free to play with other children, such 2s
school lunchtime, does the child avoid social
contact with them? For example, finds a secluded
place or goes to the library.
3. Does the child appear unaware of social
conventions or codes of conduct and make
inappropriate actions and comments? For
example, making 2 personal comment to someone
but the child seems unaware how the comment
could offend.
4. Does the child lack empathy, ie. the
intuitive understanding of another person's
feelings? For example, not realising an apology
would help the other person feel better.
5. Does the child seem to expect other people to
know their thoughts, experiences and opinions?
For example, not realising you could not know
about something because you were not with the
child at the time.
6. Does the child need an excessive amount
of reassurance, especially if things are changed or
go wrong?ZD CD
7. Does the child lack subtler)7 in their expression of
emotion? For example, the child shows distress
or affection out of proportion to the situation.
8. Does the child lack precision in their expression of
emotion? For example, not understanding the
levels of emotional expression appropriate for
different people.
9. Is the child not interested in participating
in competitive sports, games 2nd activities.
10. Is the child indifferent to peer pressure? For
example, does r.ot follow the latest craze in toys
or clothes. Rarely Frequently
0 1
1 1
2 3 4 5 6




2 3 4 5 6




2 3 4 5 6'




'3 4 5 6
1 1 1 1 1
Rarely Frequently
0 1 2
1 • 1 1
3 4 5 6




3 4 5 6




3 4 5 6




3 4 5 6




3 4 5 6
1 1 1 J
Purely
0 1 2
L I 1 .
Frequently
3 4 5 6
III!
£ COMMUNICATIONSKILLS
11. Does the child take a literal interpretation of
comments? For example, is confused by phrases
such as 'pull your socks up', 'looks can kill' or
'hop on the scales'.
12. Does the child have an unusual tone of voice? For
example, the child seems to have a 'foreign'
accent or monotone that lacks emphasis on key¬
words.
13. When talking to the child does he or she appear
uninterested in your side of the conversation? For
examole, not asking about or commenting oni. ' t-J kD
your thoughts or opinions on the topic.
14. When in a conversation, does the child tend to use
less eye contact than you would expect?
15. Is the child's speech over-precise or pedantic? For
example, talks in a formal way or like a walking
dictionary.
16. Does the child have problems repairing a
conversation? For example, when the child is
confused, he or she does not ask for clarification .
but simply switches to a familiar topic, or takes
ages to think of a reply.
0 12 3 4 5




3 4 5 6




3 4 5 6




3 4 5 6









3 4 5 6
1 1 1 1
Rarely Frequently
C. COGNITIVE SKILLS
17. Does the child read books primarily for
information, not seeming to be interested in 0 12 3 4 5 6
fictional works? For example, being an avid '—®—'—'—®'—'
reader of encyclopaedias and science books but Ra'd> Frequently
not keen on adventure stories.
IS. Does the child have an exceptional long-term
memory for events and facts? For example, 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
remembering the neighbour's car registration of I !—!—1—1—1—'
r: I
several years ago, or clearly recalling scenes that Rarely Frequent y
happened many years ago.
19. Does the child lack social imaginative play? For
example, other children are not included in the
child's imaginary games or the child is confused
by the pretend games of other children.
2 3 4 5 6
.Rarely Frequently
D SPECIFIC f.VTERESTS
20. Is the child fascinated by a particular topic and 0 12 3 4 5 6
avidly collects information or statistics on that I—1—1—I—I—1—I
interest? For example, the child becomes a Rs:i'y Frequently
walking encyclopaedia of knowledge on vehicles,
maps or league tables.
21. Does the child become unduly upset by changes in 0 l 2 3 4 5 6
routine or expectation? For example, is distressed I ! 1 I I 1 |
by going to school by 2 different route. Purely Frequently
22. Does the child develop elaborate routines or rituals 0 I "> 3 4 5 6
that must be completed? For example, lining up 1 1 1 1 1 [ 1
toys before going to bed. Rarely Frequently
E. MO'/ZMEiVTSKILLS
23. Doe's the child have poor motor coordination? For 0 12 3 4 5 6
example, is not skilled at catching 2 ball. I I I ! I L IRarely Frequently
24. Does the child have an odd gait when running? 0 12 3 4 5 6
Rarely Frequently
F. OTHER CHARACTERISTICS
For this section, tick whether the child has shown any
of the following characteristics:
(a) Unusual fear or distress due to:
0 ordinary sounds, e.g. electrical appliances O
c light touch on skin or scalp O
c wearing particular items of clothing O
0 unexpected noises O
c seeing certain objects O
0 noisy, crowded places, e.g. supermarkets O
(b) A tendency to flap or rock v/hen excited or
distressed O
(c) A lack of sensitivity to low levels of pain O
(d) Late in acquiring speech O




Instructions for the Smarties Task
Smarties task
Ask the child to name another child in their class (e.g. who do you sit next to in
class).
Show child tube ofsmarties and rattle the tube.
What do you think is in here? (child answers 'smarties')
Open the tube to showpencils
No, look there are pencils.
Putpencils back in tube and dose.
What's in here? reality question
When I first asked you, what did you say? memory question
(Other child) hasn't seen this box. If I showed him/ her this box, just like
this and asked, what's in here, what would (other child) say?'
false belief question
Is that what's really in the box? reality question
Do you remember, when I took the box out of my bag and asked you what
was in it, what did you say? memory question
APPENDIX 8:
Instructions for the Sally Anne Task
Sally-Anne Task
This is Sally and this is Anne. Show two puppets
There is a basket and a box on the table. Point to the basket and
box.
Sally and Anne both present
Sally has a ball. She puts the ball in the basket. Manipulate Sally to put
the ball in the basket
She goes away
Sally leaves, Anne remains.
Anne takes the ball and puts it in the box. Manipulate Anne to put
the ball in the box.
She goes away.
Anne leaves
Now, Sally comes back
Question
Where will Sally look first for the ball? False belief question
If answer = 'basket' then
Where is the ball really? Reality question
Where did Sally put the ball first? Memory question
APPENDIX 9:
Instructions for the False Photo Task
False Photo task
Position the doll on the mat.
Help the child take a photo of the doll on the mat.
Move the doll onto the box.
In the photo, where will the doll be?
APPENDIX 10:
Instructions for the Ice-Cream Van Task
Ice-cream van task
This is John and this is Mary. They live in this village.
Which is John/ which is Mary? Naming question
Here they are in the park. Along comes the ice-cream man. John would
like to buy an ice-cream but he has left his money at home. He s very sad.
"Don't worry' says the ice-cream man. "You can go home and get your
money and buy some ice-cream later. I'll be in the park all afternoon'
"Oh good' says John "I'll be back in the afternoon to buy an ice-cream'.
Where did the ice-cream man say to John he would be all afternoon?
Memory question
So, John goes home. He lives in this house. Now, the ice-cream man
says, "I'm going to drive my van to the church to see if I can sell my ice¬
creams outside there'
Where did the ice-cream man say he was going?
Memory question
Did John hear that?
Reality question
The ice-cream man drives over to the church. On his way he passes
John's house. John sees him and says "Where are you going?'. The ice¬
cream man says "I'm going to sell some ice-cream outside the church'.
So, off he drives to the church.
Where did the ice-cream man tell John he was going?
Memory question
Does Mary know that the ice-cream man has talked to John?
Reality question
So, John goes to the church to buy ice-cream.
Now, Mary goes home. She lives in this house. Then she goes to John's
house. She knocks on the door and says "Is John in?'. "No' says his
mother, "he's gone out to buy ice cream'.
Where does Mary think John has gone to buy an ice-cream?
False belief question
Where did John really go to buy his ice-cream?
Reality question
Where was the ice-cream man in the beginning?
Memory question
